Can Utah restrict firearm possession by convicted felons? State v. Willis Explained

Background and Facts

In State v. Willis, the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a). Willis entered a conditional guilty plea but reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. He argued that the Weapons Restrictions Statute violated his constitutional right to bear arms under the Utah Constitution.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether Utah’s prohibition on firearm possession by Category I restricted persons constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the right to bear arms guaranteed by Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Willis attempted to distinguish his case from prior precedent by arguing that previous decisions only addressed firearm use rather than mere possession.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Court of Appeals found State v. In controlling and rejected Willis’s attempt to distinguish between use and possession. The court noted that In involved a defendant convicted of illegally possessing a firearm and made no distinction between use and possession in its constitutional analysis. The court concluded that the Weapons Restrictions Statute “does not unconstitutionally interfere with one’s right to bear arms” because it only restricts that right under very limited circumstances, such as felony conviction. Such restrictions constitute a proper exercise of state police powers.

Practice Implications

This decision reinforces that Utah courts apply a presumption of statutory validity when reviewing constitutional challenges and resolve reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. Practitioners should recognize that weapons restrictions targeting specific classes of individuals, particularly convicted felons, face significant constitutional scrutiny hurdles. The court’s broad interpretation of “use” to include mere possession also suggests that attempts to create artificial distinctions between different forms of firearm restrictions are unlikely to succeed.