Can the Utah Supreme Court disbar a former judge for conduct while on the bench? In the Matter of the Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr. Explained

The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of the Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr. demonstrates the court’s broad constitutional authority to discipline attorneys for misconduct committed while serving as judges. This case provides important guidance on judicial discipline, attorney disbarment, and the intersection between criminal conduct and professional responsibility.

Background and Facts

Ray Harding, Jr., served as a Fourth District Court judge when police responded to a domestic disturbance at his home in July 2002. Officers discovered cocaine, heroin, and drug paraphernalia, and Harding tested positive for multiple controlled substances. His wife informed police that she had observed him smoking crack cocaine and that he had been using drugs since October 2001 while presiding as a judge. Harding was charged with felony drug possession, though he ultimately pled guilty to misdemeanor attempted possession charges.

Key Legal Issues

The case raised several critical issues: whether the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction to discipline Harding for judicial misconduct after his resignation, whether double jeopardy protections applied to successive disciplinary proceedings, and what standard governed attorney discipline for former judges. Harding argued that the court’s acceptance of his resignation constituted a final determination that precluded further disciplinary action.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court rejected Harding’s jurisdictional challenges, holding that Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution grants the court plenary authority to discipline lawyers for misconduct committed while serving as judges. The court distinguished between judicial removal proceedings and attorney disciplinary proceedings, finding no double jeopardy violation. Under Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, former judges remain subject to discipline for judicial misconduct unless there was a final determination in disciplinary proceedings—which had not occurred due to Harding’s resignation.

Practice Implications

The court’s disbarment order emphasizes that judges are held to the highest professional standards. While drug possession alone might not warrant disbarment, the totality of circumstances—including Harding’s continued public denials while drawing salary and delaying resignation until facing impeachment—demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. This case establishes that resignation from the bench does not insulate former judges from professional discipline and that the Utah Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over such matters without deference to screening panel recommendations.