Utah Court of Appeals

Can damaging a police vehicle constitute a jail damage offense in Utah? State v. Burgess-Beynon Explained

2004 UT App 312
No. 20030454-CA
September 10, 2004
Affirmed

Summary

Defendant kicked out the rear window of a police vehicle while confined there after her DUI arrest and was charged under the damaging jails statute. The trial court denied her motion to quash bindover, ruling that a police vehicle constitutes an “other place of confinement” under the statute.

Analysis

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed an important question of statutory interpretation in State v. Burgess-Beynon: whether damaging a police vehicle while confined inside constitutes a violation of Utah’s damaging jails statute. The court’s analysis provides valuable guidance on how Utah courts interpret criminal statutes and the scope of confinement-related offenses.

Background and Facts

Defendant was arrested for DUI and placed in the backseat of the arresting officer’s vehicle. While confined there, she became angry and kicked out the rear window. The State charged her with damaging a jail under Utah Code section 76-8-418, which criminalizes willfully damaging “any public jail or other place of confinement.” Defendant moved to quash the bindover, arguing that a police vehicle does not qualify as an “other place of confinement” under the statute.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether the phrase “other place of confinement” in the damaging jails statute encompasses police vehicles used for temporary detention. This required the court to apply statutory interpretation principles to determine the scope of the criminal offense.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

Applying the correctness standard, the Court of Appeals examined the plain language of the statute. The court determined that “confinement” means being physically contained within boundaries, and when read in context with “public jail,” the statute applies to places of confinement controlled by governmental authorities for detaining suspected criminals. The court noted that police vehicles can serve as places of confinement for detention and transportation of arrestees, citing precedent from other jurisdictions recognizing police vehicles as “temporary jail cells.”

Practice Implications

This decision broadens the application of Utah’s damaging jails statute beyond traditional detention facilities. Practitioners should recognize that any governmental confinement location—including police vehicles, transport vans, or temporary holding areas—may fall within the statute’s scope. The court’s narrow holding specifically applies where a person has been arrested and placed in a police vehicle before damaging it while confined.

Original Opinion

Link to Original Case

Case Details

Case Name

State v. Burgess-Beynon

Citation

2004 UT App 312

Court

Utah Court of Appeals

Case Number

No. 20030454-CA

Date Decided

September 10, 2004

Outcome

Affirmed

Holding

A police vehicle qualifies as an “other place of confinement” under Utah’s damaging jails statute when a person has been arrested and placed in the vehicle.

Standard of Review

Correctness for statutory interpretation

Practice Tip

When challenging charges under Utah Code section 76-8-418, focus on whether the location truly functions as a place of governmental confinement rather than arguing for narrow interpretation of statutory language.

Need Appellate Counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Related Court Opinions

    • Utah Court of Appeals

    State v. McCloud

    November 3, 2005

    The Court of Appeals may reduce a conviction to a lesser included offense when the statute of limitations bars the greater offense but the jury found all elements of the lesser offense.
    • Appellate Procedure
    • |
    • Constitutional Rights (Criminal)
    • |
    • Standard of Review
    • |
    • Statutory Interpretation
    Read More
    • Utah Court of Appeals

    State v. Rugebregt

    July 30, 1998

    Expert medical testimony regarding physical injuries consistent with forcible penetration is distinguishable from psychological profile evidence restricted by Rimmasch and is admissible where based on physical findings rather than witness veracity.
    • Discovery
    • |
    • Due Process
    • |
    • Evidence and Admissibility
    • |
    • Standard of Review
    Read More
About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.