Can a defendant amend its answer to add new defenses during discovery? Pett v. Autoliv Explained

In Pett v. Autoliv, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing a defendant to amend its answer to include the after-acquired evidence defense during ongoing discovery.

Background and Facts: Sheri Pett was terminated from Autoliv following requests for disability leave. She sued for wrongful termination, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Over a year into discovery, Autoliv sought to amend its answer to include an after-acquired evidence defense based on information about Pett’s conduct discovered during the discovery process.

Key Legal Issues: The primary issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Autoliv’s motion to amend under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Both parties also asked the court to define the scope and application of the after-acquired evidence defense, but the court declined to address these broader questions.

Court’s Analysis and Holding: The Utah Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court emphasized Rule 15(a)’s directive that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Following precedent from Cheney v. Rucker, the court noted that liberal treatment of amendment motions serves justice by allowing examination of all issues while safeguarding the opposing party’s right to reasonable time to meet new issues. Since Autoliv’s motion was filed during ongoing discovery and before trial, Pett had adequate opportunity to respond to the newly raised defense.

Practice Implications: This decision reinforces Utah’s liberal approach to pleading amendments under Rule 15(a). Practitioners should note that timing is critical—amendments sought during discovery are more likely to be granted than those filed close to trial. The court also demonstrated judicial restraint by declining to address the substantive after-acquired evidence defense questions on interlocutory appeal, emphasizing that such issues were not yet ripe for adjudication.