Can Utah courts abandon rigid reasonable doubt instruction requirements? State v. Reyes Explained

The Utah Supreme Court significantly reformed the state’s approach to reasonable doubt jury instructions in State v. Reyes, abandoning rigid requirements in favor of clearer, more comprehensible language for juries.

Background and Facts

German Cruz Reyes was charged with aggravated assault in 2002. Before trial, he objected to the court’s proposed reasonable doubt instruction, arguing it violated the three-part test established in State v. Robertson. The instruction failed to specifically state that the State must “obviate all reasonable doubt” and included the phrase “doubt which is merely possible.” The trial court overruled both objections, and Reyes was convicted. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed, finding the instruction defective under Robertson, though expressing doubt about that test’s continued viability.

Key Legal Issues

The case presented two main issues: first, whether Utah’s Robertson test for reasonable doubt instructions remained valid in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s more flexible approach in Victor v. Nebraska; and second, whether trial courts must repeat all preliminary jury instructions at the close of evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6).

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Supreme Court abandoned Robertson’s “obviate all reasonable doubt” requirement, finding it “linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect.” The court explained that this standard could actually diminish the State’s burden of proof by requiring jurors to identify and articulate specific doubts before considering them valid. Instead, the court adopted the Federal Judicial Center’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 21 as a “safe harbor” instruction, describing it as “clear, straightforward, and accurate.” On the jury instruction timing issue, the court held that Rule 17(g)(6) grants trial judges discretion in determining which instructions to give at the close of evidence.

Practice Implications

This decision provides significant guidance for criminal practitioners. Trial attorneys can now rely on the Federal Judicial Center instruction to avoid appellate challenges while maintaining flexibility to use other constitutionally adequate formulations. The ruling also clarifies that trial courts have discretion in timing jury instructions based on what best serves jury comprehension, rather than rigid mechanical requirements.