Utah Supreme Court
Does Utah's tolling statute apply when defendants leave the state but remain subject to long-arm jurisdiction? Olseth v. Larson Explained
Summary
Plaintiff sued a police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being shot while attempting to steal the officer’s vehicle. The officer had moved out of state after the incident but remained amenable to service under Utah’s long-arm statute. The federal court certified the question of whether Utah’s tolling statute applies when a defendant is physically absent but still subject to personal jurisdiction.
Analysis
In Olseth v. Larson, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether Utah Code section 78-12-35’s tolling provision applies when a defendant physically leaves Utah but remains amenable to service under the state’s long-arm statute.
Background and Facts
Plaintiff Bertina Olseth was shot by Officer Matthew Larson while attempting to steal his police vehicle after being left handcuffed and unattended. Olseth initially filed a federal civil rights action in 2000 against Salt Lake City and various officers in their official capacities. After the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Olseth refiled in 2002, naming Larson in his individual capacity for the first time—more than four years after the incident. Larson had moved out of state but remained subject to Utah’s long-arm jurisdiction. Larson moved for summary judgment, arguing the statute of limitations had expired.
Key Legal Issues
The Tenth Circuit certified this question to the Utah Supreme Court: Does Utah Code section 78-12-35 toll the statute of limitations when a defendant leaves Utah but has no in-state agent for service, yet remains amenable to service under Utah’s long-arm statute?
Court’s Analysis and Holding
The court held that the tolling statute applies based on physical absence from Utah, regardless of jurisdictional amenability. The court emphasized three factors supporting this conclusion. First, the plain language of section 78-12-35 clearly provides that time is tolled when a defendant “departs from the state.” Second, precedent consistently applied the statute’s literal meaning, with exceptions only when a statute specifically appoints an in-state agent (as in nonresident motorist cases). Third, legislative deference counseled against judicial modification of the clear statutory language, especially since the Legislature had not amended the tolling provision despite awareness of modern jurisdictional developments.
Practice Implications
This decision clarifies that Utah’s tolling statute remains viable despite modern long-arm jurisdiction. Practitioners must distinguish between physical presence in Utah and jurisdictional amenability when analyzing statute of limitations defenses. The ruling also demonstrates the court’s commitment to plain language interpretation and legislative deference when statutory text is unambiguous.
Case Details
Case Name
Olseth v. Larson
Citation
2007 UT 29
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Case Number
No. 20051180
Date Decided
March 27, 2007
Outcome
Affirmed
Holding
Utah Code section 78-12-35 tolls the statute of limitations when a defendant leaves Utah even if the defendant remains amenable to service under the long-arm statute.
Standard of Review
Federal certification – court answers certified legal questions without resolving underlying dispute
Practice Tip
When analyzing statute of limitations defenses, distinguish between physical absence from Utah (which triggers tolling under section 78-12-35) and jurisdictional amenability under the long-arm statute.
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