Can trial courts exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification in favor of jury instructions? State v. Brink Explained

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification in State v. Brink, affirming a trial court’s discretionary decision to exclude such testimony when comprehensive jury instructions could adequately address reliability concerns.

Background and Facts

Andrew Brink was charged with aggravated robbery in a case where eyewitness identification was central to the prosecution’s case. Brink sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. David Dodd regarding the reliability problems inherent in eyewitness identification. The State moved to exclude the testimony, arguing it would invade the jury’s province to assess witness credibility. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion but invited Brink to submit a cautionary jury instruction addressing eyewitness identification problems.

Key Legal Issues

The primary issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification when the court provided a comprehensive jury instruction instead. The court applied the abuse of discretion standard, recognizing that trial courts have wide latitude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on State v. Hubbard, which established that Utah has not adopted a per se rule regarding the inadmissibility of eyewitness identification expert testimony. Instead, trial courts have discretion to determine whether such testimony would constitute a mere “lecture to the jury” that could be adequately conveyed through jury instructions. The court found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by considering the specific facts of the case and allowing a detailed, five-page jury instruction that addressed the particular eyewitness identification problems present in Brink’s case.

Practice Implications

This decision emphasizes the importance of crafting detailed, case-specific jury instructions when expert testimony is excluded. The instruction in Brink went beyond generic warnings to address specific reliability factors including cross-racial identification, stress effects, photo array procedures, and confidence inflation. Defense attorneys should be prepared with comprehensive alternative jury instructions that capture the substance of proposed expert testimony, as courts may view this as an adequate substitute for live expert testimony.