What standard applies for attorney fees in child protective order cases? Cammack v. Harbaugh Explained

The Utah Court of Appeals in Cammack v. Harbaugh addressed the proper legal standard for awarding attorney fees in child protective order proceedings, clarifying the distinction between insufficient evidence and without merit under Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 37(d).

Background and Facts

The Cammacks filed an ex parte petition for a child protective order against Jason Harbaugh (Father), alleging he had sexually abused his daughter O.H. The allegations arose after O.H.’s maternal great-grandparents claimed the child disclosed abuse. The juvenile court denied the protective order petition, finding insufficient evidence to prove abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Father then moved for attorney fees under Rule 37(d), which the court granted after finding the petition was without merit.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether the juvenile court properly applied the statutory definition of “without merit” when awarding attorney fees. The Cammacks argued that a finding of insufficient evidence did not satisfy the rule’s requirements for fee-shifting. Additional issues included whether statutory immunity for reporting child abuse applied and whether the awarded fees were reasonable.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court explained that under Utah Code section 62A-4a-101(35), “without merit” means “a judicial finding that the alleged abuse, neglect, or dependency did not occur, or that the alleged perpetrator was not responsible.” This differs from “unsubstantiated,” which merely means insufficient evidence exists to conclude abuse occurred. The juvenile court had only found insufficient evidence without making the necessary finding that abuse did not occur or that Father was not responsible. The court remanded for proper application of the statutory standard.

Practice Implications

This decision emphasizes that practitioners must understand the specific statutory definitions when seeking or opposing attorney fees in juvenile proceedings. Courts cannot simply find insufficient evidence and award fees—they must make affirmative findings that alleged abuse did not occur or that the alleged perpetrator was not responsible. The court also clarified that statutory immunity for good faith reporting does not extend to filing protective order petitions with juvenile courts, as such petitions do not constitute “reports” under the immunity statute.