Does physical assault to terminate pregnancy qualify as an abortion procedure under Utah law? In re J.M.S. Explained

In In re J.M.S., the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether a pregnant minor’s solicitation of physical assault to terminate her pregnancy constituted seeking an abortion under Utah’s statutory definition, which would have exempted her from criminal liability.

Background and Facts

J.M.S., a seventeen-year-old, became pregnant and sought an abortion at a Utah clinic but was told her pregnancy was too advanced. Thirteen weeks later, she approached a stranger, Aaron Harrison, and paid him to punch her stomach to terminate the pregnancy. The assault was unsuccessful, and J.M.S. later revealed the arrangement to police. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging criminal solicitation to commit murder.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether the solicited assault qualified as a “procedure” within Utah’s abortion statute, which defines abortion as including “any and all procedures undertaken to kill a live unborn child.” Under Utah Code § 76-7-314(1), women cannot be held criminally liable for seeking abortions. The juvenile court interpreted “procedure” broadly as “a series of steps taken to achieve a result” and dismissed the petition.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that “procedure” in the abortion definition refers exclusively to medical procedures. The court based this interpretation on three grounds: (1) the plain language within the context of the Abortion Statute’s medical focus, (2) avoiding rendering provisions of the criminal homicide statute meaningless, and (3) preventing absurd results. The court noted that accepting the broad interpretation would mean any violent act intended to kill an unborn child would qualify as an abortion, creating a logical conflict with criminal homicide statutes.

Practice Implications

This decision demonstrates the importance of contextual statutory interpretation and considering how proposed interpretations affect related statutory provisions. Practitioners should examine the entire statutory scheme rather than isolated definitions. The court’s analysis also reinforces that statutory interpretation must harmonize related provisions and avoid rendering any provision superfluous or meaningless.