What constitutes cohabitation for alimony termination in Utah? Myers v. Myers Explained

The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. Myers provides crucial guidance for family law practitioners on what constitutes cohabitation sufficient to terminate alimony under Utah Code section 30-3-5(10). This case demonstrates the high bar required to prove a relationship truly “akin to marriage.”

Background and Facts

Tracy Myers sought to terminate his $1,200 monthly alimony obligation, claiming his ex-wife Becky cohabited with M.H., a teenage foster child in her parents’ home. Becky stayed at her parents’ house sporadically, sleeping on the basement couch while M.H. lived upstairs with other foster children. The district court found they shared “common residency” and had a sexual relationship, terminating Tracy’s alimony obligation. However, their children’s testimony suggested only flirtation and occasional romantic behavior.

Key Legal Issues

The court addressed two critical issues: first, whether the 1995 statutory amendment eliminated the burden-shifting procedure from Haddow v. Haddow that allowed rebuttal by proving lack of sexual contact; and second, what constitutes cohabitation under the current statute requiring only proof that “the former spouse is cohabiting with another person.”

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal, holding that cohabitation requires a relationship “akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.” The court established that sexual contact alone is insufficient—there must be marriage-like characteristics including shared residence as a principal domicile, intimate relationship, and common household involving shared expenses and decisions. The 1995 amendment eliminated the previous burden-shifting procedure, placing the entire burden on the alimony payor to prove cohabitation.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies that proving statutory cohabitation requires comprehensive evidence beyond mere sexual relationships and shared living spaces. Practitioners must demonstrate marriage-like commitment, financial interdependence, and establishment of a true common household. The unusual circumstances here—where both parties were essentially guests in a third party’s home—underscore that temporary or incidental cohabitation will not suffice for alimony termination.