Utah Court of Appeals

When does governmental immunity protect private university employees directing traffic? Mallory v. Brigham Young University Explained

2012 UT App 242
No. 20100991-CA
August 23, 2012
Affirmed in part and Reversed and Remanded in part

Summary

Mallory was injured in a motorcycle accident after BYU traffic cadet Sarah Robinson directed him into traffic following a football game. The trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding defendants were entitled to governmental immunity under the GIAU without filing a notice of claim.

Analysis

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed a critical question about the scope of governmental immunity in Mallory v. Brigham Young University, clarifying when private entities acting on behalf of government entities can claim protection under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIAU).

Background and Facts

After a BYU football game, Randal Mallory waited on his motorcycle to exit a parking lot when Sarah Robinson, a BYU traffic cadet, directed him to turn left onto University Avenue. Mallory’s motorcycle collided with another vehicle, causing serious injuries. Robinson was directing traffic under a Provo City ordinance that authorized BYU employees to direct post-event traffic on public streets while supervised by university peace officers. BYU and Robinson claimed governmental immunity, arguing they were acting as agents of Provo City and therefore protected by the GIAU’s notice of claim requirements.

Key Legal Issues

The court examined whether the defendants qualified as “Employees” under the GIAU definition, which includes “officers, employees, servants, trustees, or commissioners” but explicitly excludes independent contractors. The central question was whether authorization to perform a governmental function automatically makes the actor an agent entitled to immunity, or whether additional control requirements must be satisfied.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court distinguished between different types of agents, holding that only those who qualify as “servants” under significant governmental control are entitled to immunity as “Employees.” The court explained that while the GIAU defines “governmental function” to include acts by governmental “agents,” this does not mean all agents receive individual immunity protection. The statute deliberately protects only those agents who are also servants—individuals subject to the governmental entity’s control over the manner of performance. Independent contractors, though they may act as agents in a broad sense, cannot claim immunity under the GIAU.

Practice Implications

The decision was reversed and remanded because the record lacked sufficient evidence about Provo City’s actual control over BYU’s traffic direction activities. The court emphasized that practitioners must examine the specific master-servant relationship factors, including the right to discharge, nature of work, and most importantly, control over means and methods of performance. This ruling provides important guidance for determining when private entities performing governmental functions can claim immunity protection.

Original Opinion

Link to Original Case

Case Details

Case Name

Mallory v. Brigham Young University

Citation

2012 UT App 242

Court

Utah Court of Appeals

Case Number

No. 20100991-CA

Date Decided

August 23, 2012

Outcome

Affirmed in part and Reversed and Remanded in part

Holding

Governmental immunity under the GIAU protects only agents who are servants subject to significant governmental control, not all agents acting on behalf of a governmental entity.

Standard of Review

Correctness for questions of law and statutory interpretation; abuse of discretion for denial of Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery and venue decisions

Practice Tip

When challenging governmental immunity, focus discovery on the degree of control the governmental entity exercises over the alleged agent’s performance to establish whether a master-servant relationship exists.

Need Appellate Counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Related Court Opinions

    • Utah Supreme Court

    In re C.D.

    November 19, 2010

    The placement of Indian children with their biological fathers rendered moot the questions regarding ICWA compliance and appellate jurisdiction, and the issues did not qualify for the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
    • Appellate Procedure
    • |
    • DCFS and Child Welfare
    • |
    • Mootness
    Read More
    • Utah Court of Appeals

    State v. Hunt

    November 29, 2018

    The wanton destruction of livestock statute is not unconstitutionally vague when applied to a defendant who knew he was castrating another person’s horses, livestock ownership can be proven through conventional evidence without requiring brand inspection, and no self-defense instruction is warranted when the threat is not imminent at the time of the allegedly defensive conduct.
    • Constitutional Rights (Criminal)
    • |
    • Standard of Review
    • |
    • Statutory Interpretation
    • |
    • Sufficiency of Evidence
    Read More
About these Decision Summaries

Lotus Appellate Law publishes these summaries to keep practitioners informed — not as legal advice. Each case turns on its own facts. If a decision here is relevant to your matter, we’re happy to discuss it.