Can defendants call witnesses solely to invoke Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury? State v. Clopten Explained

Background and Facts

Deon Clopten was convicted of murdering Tony Fuailemaa after a concert in Salt Lake City. At trial, Clopten’s defense theory was that his cousin Freddie White committed the murder. To support this theory, Clopten sought to call White as a witness, knowing White would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. Clopten also attempted to introduce hearsay statements from prison inmates claiming White told them Clopten was innocent. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on eyewitness identification testimony.

Key Legal Issues

The Utah Supreme Court addressed five main issues: (1) whether defendants can call witnesses solely to invoke Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury; (2) whether White’s statements to inmates qualified as statements against interest under Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3); (3) the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony under State v. Ramirez; (4) whether prosecution expert testimony contradicting defense eyewitness reliability evidence was admissible; and (5) whether additional jury instructions on eyewitness testimony were required.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court held trial courts have broad latitude to control trial proceedings and properly excluded what would have been a “purely theatrical event.” Regarding the hearsay statements, the court applied the two-part test for statements against interest: the statement must expose the declarant to criminal liability such that a reasonable person would only make it if true, and it must have corroborating circumstances indicating trustworthiness. White’s statements failed because he had alternative motivations—protecting his cousin from prison violence—beyond the truth of the statements.

Practice Implications

This decision reinforces that trial courts have significant discretion in managing courtroom proceedings to maintain trial integrity. When seeking to admit hearsay under the statement-against-interest exception, practitioners must demonstrate not only that statements tend to expose the declarant to criminal liability, but that this tendency is sufficient to overcome any alternative motivations for making the statements. The ruling also clarifies that expert testimony disagreeing with established precedent may still be admissible if it has adequate methodological foundation.