Can highway design negligence claims proceed without expert testimony? Paget v. UDOT Explained

In Paget v. UDOT, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of highway design negligence without expert testimony. The case provides important guidance on the necessity of expert witnesses in complex engineering negligence claims.

Background and Facts

The Pagets were injured when a vehicle crossed an unbarriered median on I-80 and collided with their car. They sued UDOT, claiming the department negligently failed to install a median barrier. The trial court excluded the Pagets’ expert testimony on the applicable standard of care and granted summary judgment for UDOT. On initial appeal, the court affirmed the expert exclusion but reversed the summary judgment because UDOT had not proven its design was reasonable as a matter of law.

Key Legal Issues

UDOT petitioned for rehearing, arguing that without expert testimony, the Pagets could not establish essential elements of their negligence claim. The central question became whether the Pagets could proceed without expert testimony by arguing the lack of a median barrier was “obviously dangerous and unsafe” to laypersons.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court held that the Pagets could not establish their prima facie case without expert testimony. While acknowledging the “obviously dangerous” exception that eliminates the need for expert testimony in some negligence cases, the court found that highway design decisions involving median barriers are not within the common knowledge of laypersons. The court compared the case to Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, emphasizing that engineering assessments require “inherently complex and case-specific” analysis beyond lay understanding.

Practice Implications

This decision underscores the critical importance of expert testimony in highway design negligence cases. Practitioners must ensure their experts can survive Daubert challenges and should preserve alternative theories for establishing the standard of care. The case also demonstrates that the “obviously dangerous” exception to the expert testimony requirement is narrowly construed in complex engineering contexts. When expert testimony is excluded, plaintiffs face significant hurdles in avoiding summary judgment unless they have preserved alternative approaches in the trial court.