Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can I file a second motion to undo a default judgment? Aspenbrook Homeowners Ass'n v. Dahl

2014 UT App 99No. 20130133-CADecided May 1, 2014Real Property & Land UseAffirmed

Holding

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second rule 60(b) motion to set aside a default judgment where the motion repeated arguments rejected on the first motion and its proportionality argument was available when the first motion was filed.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the homeowners association and also awarded it attorney fees for the appeal.

  • A second motion to undo a judgment that repeats arguments the court already rejected is unlikely to get relief under rule 60(b), according to this decision.
  • Arguments that were available when the first motion was filed should be raised in that first motion.
  • The association won its attorney fees for the appeal, with the amount to be set by the district court.

What happened?

Aspenbrook Homeowners Association (the plaintiff) sued Jack and Lori Dahl (the defendants), saying they owned a property within Aspenbrook and had not paid assessments and fees. The Dahls filed a counterclaim, saying Aspenbrook’s failure to repair their roof caused them damage.

Aspenbrook sent the Dahls discovery requests, which are formal requests for information before trial. The Dahls did not answer for nearly five months. The court ordered them to respond within ten business days. They did not. The court then struck their answer and counterclaim as a penalty and entered a default judgment, a judgment entered without a trial, awarding Aspenbrook $43,775.85, interest, and attorney fees, and ordering their property sold.

What did the Dahls do next?

They filed a “motion to strike” the judgment. The district court treated it as a request to set the judgment aside under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which lets a court relieve a party from a judgment for certain reasons, and denied it. The same day as the hearing on that motion, the Dahls filed a second motion to set the judgment aside. The court denied that one too, because it raised “substantively identical” arguments.

What could the Court of Appeals look at?

Only the denial of the second motion. Earlier in the appeal, the court had ruled on Aspenbrook’s motion that it lacked jurisdiction (the power to hear the case) over the default judgment and the first denial, because the Dahls did not file timely appeals from them.

What did the court decide?

It affirmed. The Dahls argued they reasonably relied on a local court rule and that a default judgment was too harsh a penalty. The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion, meaning its decision was within the range of reasonable choices.

The second motion repeated arguments the district court had already heard and rejected. And even if the penalty argument was new, the Dahls could have raised it in their first motion. The court relied on Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ¶ 23, 263 P.3d 411, which says parties should generally raise all known grounds in one motion. Because the Dahls showed no ground for relief, the court did not consider whether they had a valid defense.

The court also rejected the complaint that the district court ruled without a hearing, since a court has wide latitude on whether to hold one on this kind of motion.

What happens now?

The judgment stands. Because Aspenbrook received attorney fees below and won the appeal, the court awarded it the fees it reasonably incurred on appeal. The case goes back to the district court only to set that amount.

What should people take from this?

A party asking a court to undo a judgment should put every available argument in the first request. A later motion that repeats rejected points, or adds ones that were available earlier, may be denied for that reason.

Bottom line

Affirmed and remanded for a determination of appellate fees (Greenwood, Sr. J., joined by Orme and Davis, JJ.; memorandum decision). A default judgment was entered against the Dahls as a discovery sanction. The district court treated their “motion to strike” as a first rule 60(b) motion and denied it; it then denied a second motion to set aside as raising the same arguments. That denial was within the court’s discretion (¶¶ 15–16, 18).

Issue 1: Jurisdiction over the earlier orders (none stated, ¶ 8): Aspenbrook’s motion for summary disposition granted in part

On Aspenbrook’s motion, the court had held that it lacked jurisdiction over the August 3, 2012 amended default judgment and the October 30, 2012 order, because no timely notice of appeal followed them. It retained jurisdiction over the December 11, 2012 order, a final, appealable order timely appealed (¶ 8). Review of a rule 60(b) denial does not reach the merits of the underlying judgment, citing AFCC Ltd. v. Kahler, 2012 UT App 124, ¶ 2, 278 P.3d 1070 (¶ 9).

Issue 2: Denial of the second rule 60(b) motion (abuse of discretion, ¶ 9): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not exceed its discretion in finding no rule 60(b) ground for relief. The motion was timely (¶ 11), but the Dahls’ arguments (reliance on a local rule, rule 54(c)(2), and proportionality of the sanction) had been raised and rejected on the motion to strike (¶ 15). Even assuming the proportionality argument was new or unconsidered, it was available when the first motion was filed and should have been raised then (¶ 15), following Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ¶ 23, 263 P.3d 411, and Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court saw no exceptional circumstances of the kind in Robinson (¶ 15 & n.8). With no ground for relief shown, it did not reach the meritorious-defense factor (¶ 16), following Express Recovery Servs. v. Davis, 2012 UT App 296, ¶ 4, 289 P.3d 606. Ruling without a hearing was also within the court’s latitude on non-dispositive motions (¶ 16 n.10), citing Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, ¶ 28 n.6, 183 P.3d 1059, and Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e).

Issue 3: Attorney fees on appeal (none stated, ¶ 17): Aspenbrook’s request for attorney fees on appeal granted

Aspenbrook is entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. A party awarded fees below that prevails on appeal is entitled to appellate fees, under Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). Although the December 11 order did not address fees, fees were awarded in the amended default judgment and the October 30 order (¶ 17). The amount is set on remand (¶ 18).

Takeaways

  • Courts may treat a mislabeled post-judgment filing as a rule 60(b) motion, and a later motion repeating its arguments may be denied on that basis (¶¶ 6, 15).
  • Arguments available when the first rule 60(b) motion is filed should be included in it (¶ 15).
  • An appeal from denial of a second rule 60(b) motion does not revive untimely appeals from the judgment or the first denial (¶¶ 8–9).
  • Fees below on the judgment can support appellate fees even when the order appealed from does not mention fees (¶ 17).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Aspenbrook Homeowners Ass'n v. Dahl
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2014 UT App 99
Case no.
20130133-CA
Filed
2013
Decided
May 1, 2014
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Dahl
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
An amended default judgment of $43,775.85 plus post-judgment interest and attorney fees, with an order to sell the Dahls' property, entered as a discovery sanction in a homeowners association's suit for unpaid assessments

The panel

Pamela T. GreenwoodAuthor
James Z. DavisConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department · Judge Ryan M. Harris

Parties & counsel

Dahl — AppellantIndividual(s)Franklin Richard Brussow
Aspenbrook Homeowners Ass'n — AppelleeBusinessFord G. ScalleyBradley W. Madsen

Practice Tip

Put every available ground in the first rule 60(b) motion; the court here relied on Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ¶ 23, 263 P.3d 411, to hold that a ground available then should have been raised then (¶ 15).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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