What constitutes knowingly permitting child endangerment in Utah drug cases? State v. Bossert Explained

The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Bossert clarified when a parent “knowingly permits” a child to be exposed to controlled substances under Utah’s child endangerment statute, rejecting arguments that only express permission can establish liability.

Background and Facts

Darryl Bossert’s ten-year-old son lived in a home where drug use was prevalent. Bossert sold methamphetamine from the residence, regularly used drugs with friends in the child’s presence, and had given his son marijuana “twenty-five to thirty times.” On February 7, 2012, the child accessed methamphetamine and marijuana from Bossert’s unlocked bedroom drawer and a guest’s purse, used both substances, then brought drugs to his elementary school where teachers discovered him smoking marijuana in a bathroom.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether Bossert “knowingly caused or permitted” his son’s exposure to controlled substances under Utah Code § 76-5-112.5(2)(a). Bossert argued that because he was asleep when his son accessed the drugs and had not given express permission for that specific access, the State failed to prove the required elements. The court also addressed whether trial courts are bound by jury instruction definitions when ruling on directed verdict motions.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court held that “permit” requires “some measure of control or participation—in other words, active or knowing acquiescence,” citing State v. Terwilliger. The court rejected narrow definitions requiring express consent, instead examining Bossert’s pattern of conduct. The evidence showed Bossert had created an atmosphere where drug use was open and prevalent, regularly provided marijuana to his son, and kept drugs in readily accessible locations despite knowing of his son’s drug use. This sustained pattern constituted knowing acquiescence in the child’s drug exposure.

Importantly, the court clarified that when ruling on directed verdict motions, trial courts are not bound by jury instruction definitions but must examine whether the State presented believable evidence of all statutory elements.

Practice Implications

This decision establishes that child endangerment liability can arise from establishing an environment that enables drug access, even without specific authorization for particular incidents. Practitioners should focus on the defendant’s overall pattern of conduct and control over the child’s environment. The ruling also confirms that statutory elements, not jury instructions, govern directed verdict analysis—a critical distinction for appellate challenges.