Utah Court of Appeals

Can prescriptive easements include parking rights? Judd v. Bowen Explained

2017 UT App 56
No. 20140285-CA
March 30, 2017
Affirmed in part and Reversed in part

Summary

The Judds claimed prescriptive easement rights to use and park on a circular driveway located almost entirely on the Bowens’ property in Big Cottonwood Canyon. After a century of shared use, disputes arose in 2008 when David Bowen became sole owner and the parties’ relationship deteriorated.

Analysis

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed a fundamental question about the scope of prescriptive easements in Judd v. Bowen, examining whether such easements can encompass parking rights or whether those rights more properly fall under adverse possession doctrine.

Background and Facts

The dispute centered on a century-old circular driveway between two Big Cottonwood Canyon cabins. The Bowens owned the property containing nearly the entire driveway, while the Judds claimed prescriptive rights for both access and parking based on historic use dating to the early 1900s. The parties coexisted peacefully until 2008, when conflicts arose after David Bowen became sole owner and increased his cabin use. The trial court awarded the Judds a prescriptive easement for both access and parking purposes.

Key Legal Issues

The primary issues were whether the Judds established the required elements for a prescriptive easement (continuous, open and notorious, and adverse use for twenty years) and whether parking rights can be acquired through prescriptive easement doctrine rather than adverse possession.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court affirmed the access easement but reversed the parking easement. Regarding access, the court found sufficient evidence supporting continuous, open and notorious, and adverse use. The Bowens failed to rebut the presumption of adversity by proving the use was initially permissive.

However, the court distinguished parking rights from access rights. The parking easement would allow the Judds to occupy and exclude the Bowens from portions of their property for indefinite periods, resembling a “time-share interest” rather than the transitory use typical of easements. This exclusive occupation more closely aligned with adverse possession requirements than the limited, non-possessory nature of easements.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies the boundary between prescriptive easements and adverse possession. Practitioners should carefully analyze whether claimed rights involve transitory use (appropriate for easements) or exclusive occupation (requiring adverse possession). The court emphasized that easements cannot effectively deprive landowners of meaningful use and enjoyment of their property, maintaining the crucial balance between easement holders’ limited rights and landowners’ ownership interests.

Original Opinion

Link to Original Case

Case Details

Case Name

Judd v. Bowen

Citation

2017 UT App 56

Court

Utah Court of Appeals

Case Number

No. 20140285-CA

Date Decided

March 30, 2017

Outcome

Affirmed in part and Reversed in part

Holding

The Judds acquired a prescriptive easement for access over the Bowens’ driveway but not for parking, as the parking right more closely resembled adverse possession than a limited easement right.

Standard of Review

Correctness for questions of law; broad measure of discretion for application of legal standard to facts; clearly erroneous standard for factual findings

Practice Tip

When seeking prescriptive easements involving parking rights, carefully analyze whether the claimed use constitutes transitory passage or exclusive occupation that would more appropriately be pursued through adverse possession.

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