Can Utah courts consider past abuse when deciding whether to dismiss protective orders? Mota v. Mota Explained

In Mota v. Mota, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified that courts may consider the egregiousness of underlying conduct when determining whether to dismiss protective orders that have been in effect for at least two years under Utah Code section 78B-7-115.

Background and Facts

The case arose from a 2011 incident where Lawrence Mota II pointed a gun at his ex-wife Jennifer and their youngest child, threatening to kill her if she called 911. Jennifer obtained a permanent protective order in 2012 after Lawrence failed to appear at the hearing. More than two years later, Lawrence sought dismissal of the protective order under Utah Code section 78B-7-115(1), which allows dismissal if “the petitioner no longer has a reasonable fear of future abuse.”

Key Legal Issues

The primary issue was whether the district court correctly interpreted subsection (f) of section 78B-7-115, which permits courts to consider “any other factors the court considers relevant” when determining if dismissal is appropriate. Lawrence argued that courts should only consider post-order conduct, not the severity of the precipitating events.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court rejected Lawrence’s narrow interpretation of subsection (f). The court held that the catch-all provision permits consideration of any relevant factors, including the egregiousness of underlying conduct. The court reasoned that a person’s actions when not subject to a court order bear on the likelihood of future abuse if no longer subject to restrictions. The commissioner properly considered that pointing a gun at someone with threats creates reasonable fear that may persist beyond two years.

Practice Implications

This decision demonstrates that compliance with subsections (a)-(e) of section 78B-7-115 does not guarantee dismissal of protective orders. Practitioners should anticipate that courts will consider the severity of original conduct under subsection (f). The decision also clarifies that failure to object to a commissioner’s recommendation under Rule 108 limits appellate challenges to factual determinations, though it does not preclude appeal entirely.