Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can I challenge my restitution order years later? State v. Wynn

2017 UT App 211No. 20150492-CADecided Nov 16, 2017Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Ineffective-assistance claims are not cognizable under rule 22(e); restitution ordered for dismissed counts reflects judicial rather than clerical error under rule 30(b); a rule 60(b)(6) motion filed six and a half years after the restitution order was properly denied as untimely; and because the sentence was legal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to order discovery.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the denial of every motion Wynn filed against his prison sentence and restitution order.

  • A motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) is not the place to argue that a defense lawyer was ineffective.
  • A disagreement with a judge’s decision about who gets restitution is not a “clerical” error that can be fixed at any time.
  • A request to set aside a restitution order must be made within a reasonable time, and unexplained delay of years can defeat it.

What happened?

In 2006 the State charged Dennis Terry Wynn, the defendant, with nineteen felonies, including securities fraud. He was also charged in federal court, pleaded guilty there to mail fraud, and was sent to federal prison.

He then made a deal with the State. He pleaded guilty to four counts of securities fraud. The judge told him restitution (money paid to the victims) would be at least $100,000 but “probably . . . many times more,” and Wynn said he understood. In October 2008 the court ordered $782,068.63 in restitution to twenty-three victims. Wynn did not object.

At a 2013 parole board hearing, Wynn said a remaining balance of $682,068 “sounds correct.” Nearly two years later, he filed motions asking the court to correct or undo his sentence and the restitution order, and asked for discovery (the exchange of evidence). The district court denied them all.

What did Wynn argue?

He said his lawyer was ineffective, meaning the lawyer’s work fell below what the Constitution requires. He claimed the plea deal promised no time in state prison, and that the restitution wrongly covered dismissed charges and people not tied to the counts he admitted. He also called the restitution amount a clerical mistake and asked the court to set the order aside under a civil rule.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals rejected each argument.

First, rule 22(e), which lets a court fix an illegal sentence at any time, covers problems with the sentence itself. A complaint about how a lawyer performed in one case is not that kind of claim. The sentence matched what the law allowed and what Wynn had been told.

Second, even if rule 22(e) applied, Wynn could not show the restitution would have come out differently. He had agreed it would be many times more than $100,000 and had agreed the balance sounded correct.

Third, the amount was not a clerical error, which means a mistake in writing down what the judge meant. The judge meant to order restitution for the dismissed counts too. If that was wrong, it was a judicial error, not a clerical one.

Fourth, the request to set aside the order came about six and a half years after the order. Wynn gave no reason for waiting nearly two years after the 2013 hearing, so the district court acted within its discretion in calling the request untimely.

Finally, because the sentence was legal, the district court no longer had power over the case and could not order discovery.

What happens now?

Nothing changes. The sentence and the restitution order stand.

What should people take from this?

Rules that allow fixes “at any time” are narrow. Claims about a lawyer’s performance, or about whether a judge decided restitution correctly, generally need another route, and waiting years without a reason can end a challenge before it starts.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Mortensen, J., joined by Orme and Christiansen, JJ.). Wynn pleaded guilty to four counts of securities fraud and in 2008 was ordered to pay $782,068.63 in restitution (¶¶ 3–5). His later motions failed on each theory (¶ 37). The court declined to decide the State’s argument that the motions were attempts to avoid the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s time limits and took each issue as presented (¶ 12).

Issue 1: Rule 22(e) and the sentence (correctness, ¶ 11): affirmed (no error)

The court held that the district court properly denied Wynn’s rule 22(e) motion, because an ineffective-assistance claim is not cognizable under rule 22(e), whether it is aimed at the prison sentence or at the restitution part of the sentence.

Part 1: The prison sentence (¶¶ 13–19)

An ineffective-assistance claim is not cognizable under rule 22(e). Under State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 26, 353 P.3d 55, rule 22(e) reaches only facial constitutional challenges to the sentence itself (¶ 17). A claim based on counsel’s performance in this case is “akin to an as-applied challenge” (¶ 18), and the court relied on State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58U, para. 9 (Greenwood, J., concurring in the result). The sentence matched the statutory maximums Wynn acknowledged in his plea statement (¶ 18). The 2017 amendment to rule 22(e) would not change the analysis (¶ 13 n.2).

Part 2: The restitution amount (¶¶ 20–23)

The restitution challenge fails for the same reason: ineffective-assistance claims are not cognizable under rule 22(e) (¶ 20). Alternatively, Wynn could not show prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). He agreed at the plea that restitution would be “many times more than” $100,000 and told the Board that a $682,068 balance “sounds correct” (¶¶ 21–22).

Issue 2: Rule 30(b) clerical error (correctness, ¶ 11): affirmed (no error)

Ordering restitution for dismissed counts was not a clerical error. Applying the factors in State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, ¶ 10, 322 P.3d 1184, the court held that the intent of the court, not of the parties, controls (¶ 25, quoting State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ¶ 15, 218 P.3d 610). The court intended to cover the dismissed counts (¶ 26). Wynn challenged that decision, not a miscalculation or a recording mistake, so any error was judicial (¶¶ 27–28). The court assumed, without deciding, what Wynn’s plea deal covered (¶ 26 n.3), and noted that the claimed error was not clear from the record (¶ 28 n.4).

Issue 3: Rule 60(b)(6) timeliness (abuse of discretion, ¶ 29): affirmed (no error)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion, filed six and a half years after the order, untimely (¶ 30). Applying the reasonable-time factors in Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 65, 150 P.3d 480, the court noted that Wynn knew or should have known the amount by the May 2013 Board hearing and offered no explanation for the nearly two-year delay that followed (¶¶ 31–33). The court did not decide whether rule 60(b) can carry ineffective-assistance claims (¶ 29), rejected the label “default judgment” (¶ 31 n.5), and did not reach the other rule 60(b) considerations (¶ 33 n.6).

Issue 4: Discovery (correctness, ¶ 11): affirmed (no error)

The district court lacked jurisdiction to order discovery. Wynn relied on its continuing jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence, but his sentence was not illegal (¶¶ 34–35, citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and see Thompson v. Wardley Corp., 2016 UT App 197, ¶ 23, 382 P.3d 682).

Takeaways

  • Rule 22(e) does not reach as-applied, ineffective-assistance attacks on a sentence (¶¶ 17–19).
  • To qualify as clerical under rule 30(b), restitution error must be a miscalculation or a recording mistake, not a judicial choice about which victims to include (¶¶ 27–28).
  • A defendant’s own earlier statements about the restitution amount can defeat both prejudice and timeliness arguments (¶¶ 22, 32).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Wynn
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2017 UT App 211
Case no.
20150492-CA
Filed
2015
Decided
November 16, 2017
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Wynn
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A state prison sentence for securities fraud and a restitution order of $782,068.63 that the defendant sought to correct or set aside years later

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Paul B. Parker

Parties & counsel

Wynn — AppellantIndividual(s)Elizabeth Hunt
State — AppelleeState of UtahSean D. ReyesLaura B. DupaixAndrew F. Peterson

Practice Tip

Do not bring an attack on counsel's performance at sentencing as a rule 22(e) motion; that rule reaches only facial challenges to the sentence itself, and Wynn's claim was treated as an as-applied one (¶¶ 17–19).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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