Can fraud on the court claims be brought under Rule 60(b)(6)? In re Estate of R.C. Willey Explained

In In re Estate of R.C. Willey, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a critical issue regarding the proper classification of Rule 60(b) motions, particularly claims involving fraud on the court. The decision provides important guidance for practitioners on timing requirements and proper pleading under Utah’s post-judgment relief rule.

Background and Facts

Don McBroom, grandson of R.C. Willey founder Rufus Call Willey, filed a Rule 60(b) motion in 2014 seeking to set aside 1973 and 1975 district court orders relating to his business interests. McBroom claimed relief under paragraphs (4) and (6), alleging the judgments were void and seeking relief based on fraud on the court. The motion was filed approximately forty years after the original orders were entered. The district court denied the motion, and McBroom appealed.

Key Legal Issues

The court addressed two primary issues: first, the proper classification of fraud on the court claims under Rule 60(b), and second, whether such claims filed decades after judgment entry could survive the rule’s timing requirements. The case also examined whether judgments are void due to alleged subject matter jurisdiction defects and conflicts of interest.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court held that fraud on the court claims must be brought under Rule 60(b)(3), not paragraph (6). The court explained that paragraph (6) is a residuary clause that cannot be used when the asserted grounds fall within paragraphs (1) through (5). Since fraud allegations are specifically covered by paragraph (3), McBroom could not proceed under paragraph (6). The court then applied the strict ninety-day time limit under Rule 60(c) for paragraph (3) motions, finding McBroom’s claims untimely. The court also rejected his paragraph (4) claims on their merits.

Practice Implications

This decision emphasizes the importance of proper pleading and timing in post-judgment relief motions. Practitioners must carefully analyze which paragraph of Rule 60(b) applies to specific claims, as the timing requirements vary significantly. Fraud claims face the restrictive ninety-day limit, while some paragraph (4) claims may have more flexible timing. The decision also clarifies that paragraph (6) cannot serve as a catch-all for claims that properly belong under other paragraphs of the rule.