Can defense counsel reasonably refuse lesser-included-offense instructions? State v. Hull Explained

In State v. Hull, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether trial counsel’s failure to request a lesser-included-offense instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The case provides important guidance for criminal defense practitioners on strategic decision-making regarding jury instructions.

Background and Facts

Defendant Hull was convicted of burglary as a second-degree felony after allegedly entering a home while the homeowner was giving him a ride to a gas station. The evidence was largely circumstantial: no witnesses saw Hull enter the house, no forensic evidence placed him inside, but stolen items were found in a trash can on the back porch. The homeowner’s brother testified that he saw Hull in the backyard after dropping him off at the house.

Key Legal Issues

Hull argued on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. Under the Strickland standard, Hull needed to prove both deficient performance and prejudice to establish ineffective assistance.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals found that counsel’s decision was objectively reasonable as part of an “all-or-nothing” defense strategy. The court recognized that while criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary, counsel could reasonably anticipate that the jury would readily convict on criminal trespass based on the brother’s direct testimony about Hull being in the backyard, even if the burglary evidence was weak. By not requesting the instruction, counsel focused the jury’s attention on the weaknesses in the State’s burglary case, hoping for complete acquittal rather than a compromise verdict.

Practice Implications

This decision reinforces that attorneys have wide latitude in making strategic decisions about jury instructions. Defense counsel must carefully weigh whether requesting lesser-included-offense instructions might actually harm their client by giving the jury an easier path to conviction. The case demonstrates that strategic decisions falling within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance” will not support ineffective assistance claims, even when the strategy ultimately fails.