Does the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act require proof of intent for misrepresentation claims? Gonzalez v. Cullimore Explained

In a significant ruling for debt collection practices, the Utah Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Cullimore clarified that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) imposes strict liability for false representations under section 1692e, requiring no proof of intent or knowledge by debt collectors.

Background and facts: Tamara Gonzalez owned a condominium unit subject to monthly association assessments. When she allegedly fell behind on payments, the association hired the Cullimore law firm to collect the debt. After receiving demand letters claiming specific amounts owed, Gonzalez disputed the figures. When negotiations failed, Cullimore filed a lawsuit. Gonzalez eventually brought FDCPA counterclaims, asserting that the firm falsely represented the character, amount, and legal status of her debt in violation of section 1692e.

Key legal issues: The central question was whether section 1692e of the FDCPA requires proof that a debt collector knew or intended to make false representations about a debt’s character, amount, or legal status. The district court had relied on the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Midland Funding LLC v. Sotolongo, which held that debt collectors could rely on client representations without FDCPA liability absent proof of knowledge or intent.

Court’s analysis and holding: The Utah Supreme Court abrogated Midland Funding, finding it incorrectly applied federal precedent and contradicted the FDCPA’s plain language. The court held that section 1692e establishes a strict liability standard, emphasizing that section 1692k(c)’s bona fide error defense would be rendered superfluous if intent were required as an element of the underlying claim. The court joined the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions holding the FDCPA to be a strict liability statute.

Practice implications: This decision requires debt collectors to exercise greater care in verifying debt information, as they cannot escape liability simply by showing reasonable reliance on client representations. For defendants, the bona fide error defense under section 1692k(c) becomes critical—requiring proof that violations were unintentional, constituted bona fide errors, and occurred despite maintaining reasonable error-prevention procedures. The court remanded for proper analysis of whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the alleged misrepresentations.