When will Utah's Supreme Court dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted? Judd v. Bowen Explained

The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Judd v. Bowen provides crucial guidance on when the state’s highest court will dismiss certiorari petitions as improvidently granted. This case involved a dispute over prescriptive easement rights to a century-old circular driveway between adjacent cabins in Big Cottonwood Canyon.

Background and Facts

For nearly a century, the Judd and Bowen families shared use of a circular driveway located almost entirely on the Bowens’ property. In 2008, tensions arose when a Judd user refused to move their vehicle at the Bowens’ request. The Judds claimed prescriptive easement rights for both access and parking, prompting the Bowens to erect gates and barricades. After a four-day bench trial, the trial court granted the Judds prescriptive easements for both purposes. The court of appeals affirmed the access easement but reversed the parking easement, determining it more closely resembled adverse possession than prescription.

Key Legal Issues

Both parties petitioned for certiorari, with the Bowens arguing the court of appeals applied incorrect legal standards for prescriptive easements, and the Judds contending the court erroneously distinguished between prescriptive easements for access versus parking. The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to address what appeared to be important and unsettled legal questions.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Supreme Court concluded that certiorari was improvidently granted because none of the Rule 46 considerations were present. The court found no conflict with prior decisions, no departure from accepted judicial proceedings, and no important questions of law requiring resolution. The court of appeals had simply applied well-established precedent requiring that prescriptive easement use be “open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for twenty years.”

Practice Implications

This decision reinforces that the Utah Supreme Court functions as a court of last resort, not an error-correction tribunal. Practitioners must demonstrate genuine conflicts with established precedent or present truly important unsettled legal questions. The Court emphasized it will not hesitate to revoke certiorari when petitions inaccurately suggest the presence of Rule 46 considerations. This case serves as a cautionary tale about the high bar for certiorari review in fact-intensive property disputes.