Utah Supreme Court · Published Opinion

Can proof that police paid key witnesses reopen a death case? Carter v. State

2019 UT 12No. 20170641Decided Mar 21, 2019Post-Conviction ReliefReversed & Remanded

Holding

Summary judgment on Carter’s Brady and Napue claims was error because, drawing all inferences in his favor, a genuine dispute of material fact exists on whether the suppressed evidence of benefits, coaching, and threats to the State’s key witnesses, and the uncorrected false testimony about benefits, prejudiced him at the guilt and sentencing phases.

Key takeaways

The Utah Supreme Court partly sided with Douglas Carter, ordering a hearing on his claims about the Tovars’ testimony while upholding the district court’s other rulings.

  • Carter gets a hearing on whether hidden evidence about the Tovars, and Mr. Tovar’s uncorrected testimony about payments, harmed him at trial and at sentencing.
  • The court did not decide that Carter must get a new trial or a new sentence; that depends on the hearing.
  • His claim that the prosecutor vouched for the Tovars came too late, and the district court’s rulings on his other evidence stand.

What happened?

Eva Olesen was murdered in her Provo home in 1985. No physical evidence linked Douglas Carter to the scene. A jury convicted him of first-degree murder based in large part on his confession and the testimony of Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, who said Carter described and acted out the killing. Mr. Tovar testified that the only benefit he and his wife got was a fourteen-dollar witness fee.

The Tovars disappeared before Carter’s 1992 resentencing, so their earlier testimony was read to the new jury, which sentenced Carter to death.

What did the Tovars later say?

In 2011, Carter’s lawyers found the Tovars. In sworn declarations, the Tovars said police threatened them with deportation, losing their infant son, and prison. They said police moved them, paid their rent, utilities and groceries, and told them not to mention those payments at trial. They also said the prosecutor told them what he wanted them to say.

What did Carter ask for?

Carter filed for post-conviction relief, a court process for challenging a conviction after the regular appeals are over. He made three claims. First, that prosecutors hid evidence that would have helped his defense (a “Brady” claim). Second, that the prosecutor let Mr. Tovar’s false testimony about benefits go uncorrected (a “Napue” claim). Third, that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the Tovars, meaning he personally assured the jury they were believable.

The district court granted summary judgment, which means deciding a claim without a hearing because no important facts are in real dispute. It ruled the new evidence could not have changed the outcome.

What did the Utah Supreme Court decide?

On the first two claims, it reversed. At this stage, the court had to read the facts in Carter’s favor. Read that way, the Tovars’ story changed over time in ways that hurt Carter: Mr. Tovar first denied knowing where the gun was, then testified he threw it in a river, and later testimony that Carter planned to “rape, break, and drive” and was “laughing and giggling” was used to argue for death.

Because the Tovars were the State’s key witnesses, a jury that heard about the payments, threats, and coaching might have seen their testimony differently. The court found this especially likely for sentencing, where it said one doubting juror can avoid a death sentence.

On the vouching claim, the court agreed it was too late. Carter knew about the prosecutor’s statements in 1985, and the law gives one year from when a person knew the facts.

The court also upheld the district court’s decisions to exclude several declarations Carter offered, mostly because they were irrelevant or were opinions on legal questions.

What happens now?

The case goes back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, a hearing where witnesses testify and the judge weighs the evidence. The court there will decide whether the hidden evidence and uncorrected testimony harmed Carter. Carter’s conviction and sentence are not undone by this decision.

What should people take from this?

When a case rests heavily on a few witnesses, evidence that the State paid or pressured them can matter a great deal. But a claim based on something that happened openly at trial must be brought within the time limits, even if new evidence surfaces later.

Bottom line

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (Himonas, J., joined by Pearce and Petersen, JJ., and Court of Appeals Judges Mortensen and Pohlman; Durrant, C.J., and Lee, A.C.J., recused). Carter showed a genuine dispute of material fact on whether he was prejudiced by the Brady and Napue material in the Tovars’ 2011 declarations (¶¶ 42, 166). The vouching claim is time-barred, and the evidentiary rulings stand (¶¶ 43, 166).

Issue 1: Brady materiality (correctness, ¶ 39): reversed

Summary judgment on the Brady claim was error because a genuine dispute exists on materiality at both phases (¶ 86). The State did not challenge the findings of disputed fact on favorability and suppression (¶¶ 54, 86), and PCRA prejudice uses the Brady materiality standard (¶ 55). Drawing inferences for Carter, the Tovars’ testimony “evolved over time” in ways that damaged him (¶ 67), and it is reasonable to infer the changes were driven partly by benefits and coaching (¶¶ 68, 74–75, applying Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ¶ 22, 390 P.3d 314). Coaching alone was likely insufficient, but materiality is collective under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (¶ 74). Threats tied to orders to lie about benefits were not cumulative of threats known at trial (¶ 84). The Tovars were the State’s key corroborating witnesses, citing State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645 (Utah 1995) (¶¶ 91–95). Sentencing was the “much easier” case, given the State’s reliance on the Tovars’ state-of-mind testimony, following Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ¶ 29, 128 P.3d 1123 (¶¶ 100–106). The court rejected the State’s preservation argument (¶ 64 n.11) and did not reach Carter’s challenge to the court’s use of extra-record evidence (¶ 63 n.10).

Issue 2: Napue (correctness, ¶ 39): reversed

A genuine dispute exists on whether correcting Mr. Tovar’s “witness fee only” testimony would have produced a different outcome (¶¶ 112, 115). The court rejected the findings that the testimony was consistent and that the benefits evidence could hurt Carter as much as help him (¶¶ 113–114). Because the claim survives the more stringent PCRA standard, the court did not address whether the district court applied the wrong standard (¶ 112 n.18).

Issue 3: Improper vouching (correctness, ¶ 39): affirmed (no error)

The claim is barred by the one-year limit in Utah Code § 78B-9-107(2)(e) (¶ 121). Vouching turns on the prosecutor’s statements, not the truth of the testimony, so the clock started at trial in 1985 (¶ 121, citing State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1989)).

Issue 4: Killpack declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

No abuse of discretion; the excluded portions lacked personal knowledge and gave legal conclusions under rule 704 (¶ 127).

Issue 5: Lebegue declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

The prosecutor’s conduct in another case was improper character evidence under rule 404; his understanding of his duties is irrelevant to Brady or Napue (¶ 132 & n.21).

Issue 6: Cunningham declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

Irrelevant under rule 402; trial counsel already had every reason to attack the confession (¶ 137).

Issue 7: Dowling report (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

Irrelevant; any confession challenge is procedurally barred, and non-Brady mitigation is not part of materiality (¶ 142).

Issue 8: Kurumada declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

Irrelevant to the Brady and Napue claims (¶ 147).

Issue 9: Hunt declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

The excluded portions were irrelevant beyond explaining delay (¶ 152).

Issue 10: Rich declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

Counsel’s views on what he should have done have no bearing on the violations (¶ 157).

Issue 11: Exclusion of Bermudez declaration (mixed, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

The court affirmed the exclusion of Ms. Bermudez’s declaration: it did not decide Carter’s rule 404 argument because it was inadequately briefed, and it held the statements about the Tovars were inadmissible hearsay (¶¶ 162–163).

Part 1: Police threats against Ms. Bermudez (rule 404(b)) (¶ 162) The court agreed that Carter’s admission that the declaration shows Provo Police “used threats of deportation” means the evidence is being used as character evidence under rule 404(b). Carter argued rule 404 does not apply because no individual officer is identified. That raises an open question of “whether rule 404 applies to groups and entities,” but Carter’s brief had “only one (tautological) sentence” on it and cited no authority. The court called this “plainly inadequate,” did not pass on the claim that rule 404 cannot apply, and affirmed the district court’s ruling on this issue (not reached).

Part 2: Statements that the Tovars were threatened (hearsay) (¶ 163) The statements “appear to be offered for the truth of the matter asserted and no hearsay exception applies.” The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s objection (affirmed, no error).

Not reached

  • Issue 11: whether rule 404 applies to groups and entities, which the court called an open question; Carter’s single sentence without authority was inadequate briefing, so the ruling was affirmed (¶ 162).
  • Issue 13: the Watson deposition rulings, which Carter did not brief (¶ 165).

Takeaways

  • On summary judgment in a PCRA case, inconsistencies in key witnesses’ testimony plus allegations of benefits and threats can support reasonable inferences, not speculation (¶¶ 68, 75).
  • Threats are non-cumulative when tied to orders to give false testimony, even if other threats were known at trial (¶ 84).
  • A vouching claim’s limitation period runs from the statements at trial, not from later evidence about the witness (¶ 121).
  • An undeveloped legal argument, even on an open question, will not be passed on (¶ 162).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Carter v. State
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Citation
2019 UT 12
Case no.
20170641
Filed
2017
Decided
March 21, 2019
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Carter
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
At stake
A post-conviction challenge to a 1985 first-degree murder conviction and a death sentence imposed at a 1992 resentencing.

The panel

Deno G. HimonasAuthor
David N. MortensenConcurred
John A. PearceConcurred
Paige PetersenConcurred
Jill M. PohlmanConcurred
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANTDid not participate
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEEDid not participate
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Utah County · Judge Lynn W. Davis

Parties & counsel

Carter — AppellantIndividual(s)Loren E. WeissJon M. SandsPaula K. HarmsEric Zuckerman
State — AppelleeState of UtahAndrew F. Peterson, Utah Attorney General's OfficeErin Riley, Utah Attorney General's OfficeDaniel W. Boyer, Utah Attorney General's Office

Practice Tip

When opposing summary judgment on a Brady claim, show how a key witness's testimony changed over time and tie those changes to the alleged benefits or pressure; the court treated that link as a reasonable inference rather than speculation (¶¶ 67–68, 75).

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