Can alleged fathers challenge paternity when a child has a presumed father? Castro v. Lemus Explained

The Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Castro v. Lemus significantly clarifies standing requirements under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA), overruling prior court of appeals precedent that had restricted alleged biological fathers from challenging paternity in certain circumstances.

Background and Facts

Oscar Castro sought to establish paternity of a child born to Mari Teresa Lemus, who was married to another man when the child was conceived and born. Under the UUPA, Lemus’s husband was the presumed father of the child. When Castro filed a petition to establish his paternity, Lemus moved to dismiss, arguing that Castro lacked standing under the court of appeals’ decision in R.P. v. K.S.W. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the UUPA denied Castro standing to challenge the presumed father’s paternity.

Key Legal Issues

The central question was whether the UUPA grants standing to alleged fathers when the child has a presumed father. Specifically, the court examined whether Utah Code section 78B-15-602, the UUPA’s general standing provision, is modified by subsection 78B-15-607(1), which addresses limitations in proceedings involving children with presumed fathers.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the statutory interpretation question by examining the plain language of the UUPA. Section 78B-15-602 explicitly grants standing to “a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.” The court concluded that subsection 607(1) does not limit this standing but instead creates timing deadlines for specific parties—the mother, presumed father, and support enforcement agencies—in divorce proceedings. The court emphasized that subsection 607(1) is titled “Limitation” not “Standing Limitation” and contains no express language limiting standing.

Practice Implications

This decision overrules R.P. v. K.S.W. and establishes that alleged biological fathers have standing under the UUPA regardless of whether the child has a presumed father. Practitioners representing alleged fathers should focus on section 602’s standing provision and argue that other UUPA provisions create procedural requirements rather than standing limitations. The court also applied the constitutional avoidance canon, noting that denying standing to all alleged fathers would raise serious due process concerns.