Utah Supreme Court
Does placing a child for adoption constitute abandonment under ICWA? In re Adoption of B.B. Explained
Summary
Birth mother C.C., a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, moved from the reservation to Utah and placed her child B.B. for adoption. The district court transferred the case to tribal court, finding B.B. was domiciled on the reservation either because his mother remained domiciled there or because she had abandoned him, shifting his domicile to his father on the reservation.
Analysis
In In re Adoption of B.B., the Utah Supreme Court addressed a critical question about domicile and abandonment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The case involved B.B., a child whose unmarried biological parents were both members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
Background and Facts
Birth mother C.C. and birth father E.T. initially resided on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. Around June 2014, C.C. moved to Utah seeking housing and employment opportunities, with the plan for E.T. to follow. C.C. gave birth to B.B. in Utah and placed him for adoption through Heart to Heart, a Utah adoption agency. The district court later granted a motion to transfer the case to tribal court, finding that B.B. was domiciled on the reservation either because C.C. remained domiciled there or because she had abandoned B.B., shifting his domicile to E.T.’s reservation domicile.
Key Legal Issues
The court addressed two primary issues: (1) whether C.C. was domiciled in Utah at the time of B.B.’s birth, and (2) whether her initiation of formal adoption proceedings constituted abandonment that would shift B.B.’s domicile to his father’s reservation domicile. Under ICWA section 1911(a), tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian children who reside or are domiciled within the reservation.
Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that C.C. was domiciled in Utah when B.B. was born based on uncontradicted evidence of her intent to remain permanently in Utah. More significantly, the court held that a birth mother’s consent to adoption in formal proceedings does not constitute abandonment under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The court emphasized that abandonment requires an intent to “immediately and unconditionally relinquish parental rights and obligations,” which is not present when a parent initiates formal adoption proceedings that remain contingent on court approval.
Practice Implications
This decision provides important guidance for practitioners handling ICWA cases. The court’s analysis distinguishes between actual abandonment and formal adoption proceedings, clarifying that the latter does not automatically shift a child’s domicile for jurisdictional purposes. The decision also reinforces the importance of carefully analyzing a parent’s intent when determining domicile under the uniform federal standard established in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.
Case Details
Case Name
In re Adoption of B.B.
Citation
2020 UT 53
Court
Utah Supreme Court
Case Number
No. 20180612
Date Decided
July 28, 2020
Outcome
Reversed
Holding
A birth mother’s initiation of formal adoption proceedings does not constitute abandonment under the Indian Child Welfare Act for purposes of determining an Indian child’s domicile.
Standard of Review
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Fact-intensive mixed determinations of domicile are subject to deferential review where the correct legal standard is applied.
Practice Tip
When determining domicile under ICWA, carefully analyze the Indian parent’s intent at the time of the initial move and distinguish between formal adoption proceedings and actual abandonment.
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