Can defense counsel reasonably refuse to admit potentially helpful DNA evidence? State v. Phillips Explained

In State v. Phillips, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when refusing to stipulate to the admission of late-disclosed DNA evidence that contained both harmful and potentially helpful elements.

Background and Facts

Phillips was convicted of child rape after DNA evidence showed his genetic material on the victim’s underwear. Phillips claimed his DNA transferred from a towel he used after having sex with his wife, since their laundry was mixed together. During trial, additional DNA results arrived showing Phillips’s DNA on two more pairs of the victim’s underwear. Significantly, one pair contained an unknown third contributor. However, because of the late disclosure, defense counsel refused to stipulate to admission of this evidence, and it was excluded from trial.

Key Legal Issues

Phillips argued his counsel was ineffective on two grounds: first, for refusing to stipulate to the additional DNA evidence that showed a third contributor (which could have supported his transfer theory), and second, for failing to object when the prosecutor argued in closing that only two DNA profiles were found on the admitted evidence.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals applied the two-prong Strickland test, requiring proof that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. The court found counsel’s decisions were strategically reasonable. Regarding the DNA evidence, while the third contributor might have been helpful, counsel could reasonably conclude that admitting evidence showing Phillips’s DNA on two additional pairs of underwear would be more harmful than beneficial. For the closing argument issue, the court found the prosecutor’s statement was accurate regarding the evidence actually admitted at trial.

Practice Implications

This decision reinforces the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within reasonable professional assistance. When faced with mixed evidence containing both inculpatory and exculpatory elements, attorneys must carefully weigh the strategic implications. Courts will not second-guess reasonable tactical decisions, even when alternative strategies might appear superior in hindsight.