Can separate workplace conversations constitute stalking in Utah? Richins v. Weldon Explained

In Richins v. Weldon, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether threatening statements made during separate workplace conversations could establish a course of conduct sufficient for a civil stalking injunction. The case provides important guidance on how Utah courts analyze stalking claims involving indirect communications through third parties.

Background and Facts

Timothy Richins, a company vice president, sought a stalking injunction against Mark Weldon, who managed the building where Richins’s company leased space. Their relationship had been contentious since November 2020, involving civil disputes over lease obligations. On August 27, 2021, Weldon made threatening statements about Richins during two separate workplace meetings. In the first meeting with company employees, Weldon expressed anger toward Richins, claimed he was surveilling him, and threatened to get a gun and shoot someone if a borrowed screwdriver wasn’t returned. In a second meeting minutes later with different participants, Weldon told the CEO he wanted to kill Richins and that if he was going to die, he would take others out first.

Key Legal Issues

The primary issue was whether Weldon’s statements constituted a course of conduct under Utah Code § 76-5-106.5, which requires “two or more acts directed at or toward a specific individual.” Weldon argued the conversations were part of one continuous episode occurring over 13-19 minutes and should not be considered separate acts. The court also had to determine whether statements made to third parties could be “directed at” the victim when communicated indirectly.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s permanent injunction. The court held that the two meetings constituted separate acts because they were not simultaneous, involved different participants, were separated by time, and were not inherent in each other. Following Butters v. Herbert, the court emphasized that acts must be considered “cumulatively in light of all the facts and circumstances” rather than in isolation. The court also confirmed that Utah’s stalking statute permits acts performed “directly, indirectly, or through any third party,” making Richins’s physical absence from the meetings irrelevant.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies that temporal proximity alone does not prevent separate conversations from constituting distinct acts under the stalking statute. Practitioners should focus on whether acts are truly simultaneous and inherent in each other, as established in Hardy v. Hardy. The ruling also reinforces that indirect threats communicated through workplace colleagues can satisfy stalking elements, particularly when the overall context demonstrates the statements were directed at the victim. When evaluating the second element requiring that conduct would cause a reasonable person fear or emotional distress, courts must apply an individualized objective standard considering the victim’s specific circumstances, including workplace relationships and potential damage to reputation or livelihood.