Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

If a bar settles a drunk-driving suit, can it make the driver pay a share? RMB Inc. v. Celotto

2024 UT App 188No. 20230393-CADecided Dec 19, 2024Personal Injury & TortsAffirmed

Holding

“Award,” as used in Utah Code section 32B-15-302(1)(a), does not extend to voluntary settlements, so bars that settled the injured driver’s Dramshop Act claims could not bring contribution claims against the driver under that provision.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Celotto, the driver, and held that the two bars that settled could not sue him for contribution.

  • Under Utah’s Dramshop Act, a contribution claim is open to a person “against whom an award is made.”
  • The court held that an “award” is something imposed by an authority such as a judge, jury or arbitrator, and does not include a voluntary settlement.
  • The two bars that settled could not seek contribution from the driver under that provision.

What happened?

According to the opinion, Corbin G. Celotto caused a crash with injuries after an evening of barhopping and drinking a lot of alcohol. The injured driver sued Celotto. He later added claims against five bars under Utah’s Dramshop Act, a law that can make businesses liable for serving alcohol to someone who is already obviously drunk.

Two of the bars, RMB Inc. and Shaman Inc. (the Bars), filed contribution claims against Celotto. A contribution claim asks another person who caused the harm to pay their share.

The claims against two bars were dismissed. The injured driver settled with Celotto, and he settled with the other three bars for a combined one million dollars. That left only the Bars’ contribution claims against Celotto.

What did each side argue?

The Dramshop Act lets a person “against whom an award is made” sue for contribution. Celotto argued that there was no trial or arbitration, so there was no “award,” only a settlement. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment, meaning it ruled for Celotto without a trial.

The Bars appealed. They argued that “award” means a payment, and that their settlement payment counted because the injured driver’s request came in the form of a lawsuit.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It agreed with the district court. The court looked at the plain words of the statute and gave three reasons.

First, the dictionary meaning. “Award” means a judgment or final decision, especially by arbitrators or a jury, or something conferred on a person. Nothing in those definitions covers a bargained-for settlement.

Second, the grammar. The phrase “against whom an award is made” describes something imposed on someone by someone with the authority to do so. The court called the Bars’ argument about “award” being a noun “as esoteric as it is unpersuasive.”

Third, the surrounding words. The next part of the statute limits contribution to the share of “the damages” matching the other person’s share of fault. The court read that as showing the award comes from a process where the two sides oppose each other in front of a decision-maker, not from a settlement.

What happens now?

Nothing goes back to the district court. The summary judgment for Celotto stands, and the Bars cannot pursue their contribution claims against him under this provision.

What should people take from this?

Under this ruling, a bar that settles a Dramshop Act claim has not had an “award” made against it, so the Act’s contribution provision does not apply. The court noted in a footnote that the Legislature is free to change the statute to cover settlements or “claims paid” if it wants to.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Mortensen, J., joined by Orme and Oliver, JJ.). After the injured driver settled with Celotto and three bars, two of those bars (RMB Inc. and Shaman Inc.) pursued contribution crossclaims against Celotto under Utah Code § 32B-15-302(1)(a) (¶¶ 2–4). “Award,” as used in that provision, “does not extend to voluntary settlements,” which precludes the Bars’ contribution claims (¶ 16).

Issue 1: Whether a settlement is an “award” under § 32B-15-302(1)(a) (correctness, ¶ 6): affirmed (no error)

The district court correctly held that “award” excludes amounts paid under a bargained-for settlement (¶ 10). The court relied on three points:

  • Ordinary meaning. The Dramshop Act does not define “award,” so the court started with dictionaries, following Bermes v. Summit County, 2023 UT App 94, ¶ 36, 536 P.3d 111 and State v. Hatfield, 2020 UT 1, ¶ 17, 462 P.3d 330. Webster’s and Black’s define it as a judgment or final decision, especially by an arbitrator or jury, or something conferred; nothing extends it to bargained-for settlements (¶¶ 11–12).
  • Grammar. The Bars argued that the noun use of “award” supports including settlements. The court rejected this as “esoteric” and “unpersuasive.” Read as a clause, “against whom an award is made” uses a passive construction showing that “some authority ‘make[s]’ an award” imposed on someone, even though the statute does not say whether a judge, jury or arbitrator makes it (¶¶ 13–14).
  • Statutory context. Subsection (1)(b) caps contribution at the proportion “of the damages” equal to the other person’s fault, which shows the award is the product of an adversarial process (¶ 15). A reading that contradicts the plain language is not reasonable, citing State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11, 478 P.3d 1048 and Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 984 (¶ 15).

The court found the statute’s plain language clear and did not turn to legislative history (¶¶ 9–10). In a footnote, it noted the Legislature may add “settlements” or “claims paid” to the statute if it wishes (¶ 15 n.2).

Takeaways

  • A party that settles a Dramshop Act claim is not a person “against whom an award is made” under § 32B-15-302(1)(a) (¶ 16).
  • The court read “award” as something an authority imposes after an adversarial process, though it did not decide which decision-makers qualify (¶¶ 14–15).
  • Subsection (1)(b)’s reference to “damages” was part of the textual basis for the holding (¶ 15).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
RMB Inc. v. Celotto
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2024 UT App 188
Case no.
20230393-CA
Filed
2023
Decided
December 19, 2024
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Celotto
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Two bars' contribution claims under the Dramshop Act against the driver for money they paid to settle an injured driver's claims

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Gregory K. OrmeConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Patrick W. Corum

Parties & counsel

Celotto — AppellantBusinessTrent J. Waddoups
RMB Inc. — AppelleeIndividual(s)Bryan J. StoddardBlake A. HallockJonathan P. Barnes Jr.

Practice Tip

A dramshop defendant weighing settlement should know that, under this decision, paying a settlement does not count as an "award" that triggers contribution rights under section 32B-15-302(1)(a) (¶¶ 15–16).

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