Can Utah courts compare negligent and intentional conduct under the comparative fault statute? Field v. The Boyer Co. Explained

In a significant ruling on Utah’s comparative fault statute, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether courts can compare negligent conduct with intentional tortious conduct and whether fault can be allocated to nonparty unknown assailants.

Background and Facts

Lois Field, an employee at Mervyn’s in Brickyard Plaza, was sexually assaulted by an unknown attacker in the employee parking lot in September 1994. Field sued the property owners, alleging they negligently failed to provide adequate security. The defendants sought to have the jury compare their allegedly negligent conduct with the unknown assailant’s intentional criminal conduct under Utah’s comparative fault statute, Utah Code section 78-27-38.

Key Legal Issues

The court addressed two critical questions: (1) whether Utah’s comparative fault statute permits comparison of negligent and intentional conduct, and (2) whether fault can be allocated to a nonparty unknown tortfeasor who has not been joined as a defendant.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court affirmed that Utah Code section 78-27-37(2)’s definition of “fault” as “any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury” encompasses both negligent and intentional conduct. However, the court reversed on fault allocation, finding that while courts may “consider” any person’s conduct under section 78-27-38(4)(a), they may only “allocate” fault to three categories: plaintiffs, defendants, and persons immune from suit. The court distinguished between considering nonparty conduct in determining relative fault percentages versus actually allocating fault to nonparties.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies that defendants seeking fault comparison with nonparty tortfeasors must join them under Utah Code section 78-27-41 or risk bearing the full burden of unallocated fault. The ruling also sparked significant debate, with Justice Stewart’s partial dissent arguing that comparing negligent and intentional conduct violates sound policy and legislative intent.