Utah Court of Appeals

Can broad release language protect unnamed defendants in Utah? Thornock v. Jensen Explained

1997 UT App
No. 960681-CA
December 18, 1997
Reversed

Summary

Plaintiff executed a release naming defendant’s husband (the policy holder) after an automobile accident involving defendant as the driver. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based on the release’s broad language. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the release did not protect defendant because she was not specifically named or identified.

Analysis

In personal injury settlements, the scope of release agreements can significantly impact future litigation rights. The Utah Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Thornock v. Jensen, examining whether broad boilerplate language in a release can protect defendants who are not specifically named.

Background and Facts

Following an automobile accident, plaintiff Bonnie Thornock executed a release with the insurance company in exchange for $469. The release named only defendant Dorothy Jensen’s husband, Lowell Jensen, who was the policy holder but was not involved in the accident. The release contained standard boilerplate language purporting to release “all individuals” who “could be liable for the above-referenced accident.” When Thornock later sued the actual driver, Jensen moved for summary judgment based on the release.

Key Legal Issues

The court addressed whether Utah Code § 78-27-42 applied when a release names only a non-defendant party, and whether broad language could discharge an unnamed tortfeasor from liability. The statute provides that a release “does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.”

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals reversed, applying the Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Child v. Newsom that releases must “contain language either naming the defendant or identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity.” The court rejected the argument that § 78-27-42 was inapplicable because the named party was not a “defendant,” finding such interpretation would create an absurd result contrary to the statute’s purpose of preventing automatic discharge of unnamed tortfeasors.

Practice Implications

This decision emphasizes the critical importance of precise drafting in release agreements. Insurance adjusters and attorneys must specifically name all parties intended to be released rather than relying on broad language. The court’s analysis demonstrates that Utah courts will not permit boilerplate language to circumvent the statutory requirement for specific identification of released parties.

Original Opinion

Link to Original Case

Case Details

Case Name

Thornock v. Jensen

Citation

1997 UT App

Court

Utah Court of Appeals

Case Number

No. 960681-CA

Date Decided

December 18, 1997

Outcome

Reversed

Holding

A release that names only an uninvolved party does not discharge another defendant from liability under Utah Code § 78-27-42, even when broad boilerplate language is included.

Standard of Review

Correctness for questions of law on summary judgment

Practice Tip

When drafting releases in personal injury cases, specifically name all potentially liable parties rather than relying on boilerplate language to extend protection to unnamed defendants.

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