Can municipalities prohibit short-term residential rentals without express ordinance language? Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment Explained

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether municipalities can prohibit short-term residential rentals through interpretation alone in Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment. This case establishes important precedents for both zoning interpretation and the proper standard of review for municipal boards.

Background and Facts
Property owners in Sandy City leased their single-family homes to families for periods ranging from several days to several months. In 1995, city staff began interpreting the development code to prohibit any residential rental shorter than thirty days, despite the absence of express durational language. The Board of Adjustment upheld this interpretation using a “rational basis” test, and the district court granted summary judgment for the city.

Key Legal Issues
The court addressed two critical questions: first, what standard of review boards of adjustment must apply when reviewing staff interpretations, and second, whether zoning ordinances can implicitly prohibit short-term leases without express language. The case turned on statutory interpretation principles and the proper construction of zoning restrictions.

Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed, establishing that boards must review staff interpretations for correctness, not rationality. Applying strict construction principles, the court held that zoning ordinances “in derogation of a property owner’s common-law right to unrestricted use” must be strictly construed against municipalities. Since the ordinance permitted single-family dwelling occupancy by families without durational limits, short-term leases could not be prohibited through interpretation alone.

Practice Implications
This decision reinforces that zoning ordinances cannot restrict property uses through implication—express language is required. Municipal boards must apply correctness review to staff interpretations, not deferential standards. For practitioners, this case demonstrates the importance of challenging both the substantive interpretation and the procedural standard applied by administrative bodies in land use disputes.