Can battery occur within the scope of employment under Utah law? Clark v. Pangan Explained

The Utah Supreme Court in Clark v. Pangan addressed fundamental questions about when intentional torts, specifically battery, can subject employers to vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Background and Facts

Clark and Pangan were both employees of the U.S. Postal Service, with Pangan serving as Clark’s part-time supervisor. During a workplace disagreement about inspection procedures and paperwork, Pangan attempted to escort Clark to his office to avoid arguing in front of other employees. Clark alleged that Pangan hit or shoved him during this interaction, while Pangan claimed he merely opened his hand to block Clark and pointed toward his office. After Clark filed suit in state court, the United States certified that Pangan was acting within the scope of employment, allowing federal substitution under the Westfall Act and removal to federal court.

Key Legal Issues

The federal district court certified two critical questions to the Utah Supreme Court: (1) whether the intentional tort of battery is outside the scope of employment as a matter of law under Utah state law, and (2) what test should be employed to determine whether battery falls within the scope of employment.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court firmly rejected the proposition that battery is categorically outside the scope of employment as a matter of law. The court clarified that prior cases, including D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines and Justice Stewart’s dissent in S.H. v. State, did not establish such a categorical rule. Instead, those cases involved fact-specific determinations that particular instances of intentional torts were outside the scope of employment in those specific circumstances.

The court reaffirmed the three-part Birkner test for determining scope of employment: (1) the conduct must be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform, (2) it must occur within the hours and ordinary spatial boundaries of employment, and (3) it must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer’s interest. The court declined to adopt a fourth “expectability” prong from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, finding that the existing test already accounts for expectability considerations.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies that intentional torts, including battery, require case-by-case analysis under the Birkner test rather than categorical exclusion from scope of employment. Practitioners should focus on the specific factual circumstances surrounding the alleged battery, particularly whether the employee’s conduct was motivated even partially by serving the employer’s interests, rather than arguing that intentional torts are automatically outside the scope of employment.