Are filing fees jurisdictional requirements for commencing Utah civil actions? Dipoma v. McPhie Explained

The Utah Court of Appeals addressed a critical issue for practitioners in Dipoma v. McPhie: whether filing fees constitute jurisdictional requirements for commencing civil actions under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 3.

Background and Facts

Mary Ann Lucero Dipoma filed a pro se complaint against Brian McPhie on November 24, 1997, seeking damages for injuries from a November 29, 1993 traffic accident. She submitted a personal check for the filing fee, but the check was returned for insufficient funds on December 29, 1997—after the four-year statute of limitations had expired under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Dipoma eventually paid the filing fee on August 11, 1998, nearly nine months after the limitations period had run. The trial court granted McPhie’s summary judgment motion, holding that the complaint was not properly “filed” until payment was made.

Key Legal Issues

The court addressed whether Utah Code sections 21-1-1, 21-1-5, and 21-7-2, which require court clerks to collect fees in advance, make filing fees jurisdictional prerequisites for commencing actions under Rule 3. The court also considered whether Rule 3’s plain language incorporates these statutory fee requirements.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court of Appeals reversed, applying correctness review to this question of law. The court distinguished between jurisdictional and administrative requirements, noting that Rule 3 contains no express language making filing fees jurisdictional. Unlike Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14, which explicitly states the clerk “shall not accept” petitions without fees, Rule 3 simply requires “filing a complaint with the court.” The court declined to read additional jurisdictional requirements into the rule’s plain language, finding that Utah Code sections governing fees are merely “directive to court clerks” rather than jurisdictional mandates.

Practice Implications

This decision protects plaintiffs from harsh results due to circumstances beyond their control, such as bank errors causing check returns. However, practitioners should note the concurring and dissenting opinion suggesting that unreasonable delays in paying fees after notice of bounced checks could still warrant dismissal. The majority declined to address this “reasonable time” standard, leaving some uncertainty about acceptable payment delays after initial filing.