Can former domestic partners claim visitation rights under in loco parentis? Jones v. Barlow Explained

The Utah Supreme Court addressed a question of first impression in Jones v. Barlow: whether former domestic partners have standing to seek visitation with children they helped raise when the biological parent objects.

Background and Facts

Cheryl Barlow and Keri Jones entered a Vermont civil union and jointly decided to have a child through artificial insemination. Barlow conceived and bore the child, with Jones participating in prenatal care and delivery. For the first two years of the child’s life, both women lived together and shared parenting responsibilities. The child’s surname was “Jones Barlow,” and the parties obtained a court order designating Jones as co-guardian. When their relationship ended, Barlow terminated all contact between Jones and the child and successfully petitioned to remove Jones as co-guardian.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether Jones had standing to seek visitation under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court found that Jones had standing and granted visitation, but Barlow appealed, arguing that no such common law right exists.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the in loco parentis doctrine is temporary by nature and does not grant perpetual rights after the relationship ends. The court corrected its earlier statement in Gribble v. Gribble that only surrogate parents or children could terminate the relationship, clarifying that legal parents may also end in loco parentis relationships. The court declined to adopt a “de facto parent” doctrine, finding such judicial lawmaking would exceed proper judicial bounds and conflict with existing statutory schemes governing parent-child relationships and visitation rights.

Practice Implications

This decision significantly limits non-biological parents’ ability to claim visitation rights in Utah. Practitioners should focus on specific statutory provisions rather than common law theories when seeking standing for clients who lack biological or legal parent status. The court’s emphasis on legislative rather than judicial resolution of these issues suggests that statutory amendments may be necessary to address modern family structures involving same-sex couples and other non-traditional arrangements.