Can reasonable doubt jury instructions use the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt"? State v. Austin Explained

In State v. Austin, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether reasonable doubt jury instructions containing the phrase “eliminate all reasonable doubt” violate constitutional standards. This consolidated case involving three defendants provides important guidance for practitioners regarding the evaluation of jury instructions under the Victor test.

Background and Facts

Three defendants—Austin, Halls, and Kinne—were convicted of separate criminal offenses in cases where the trial courts gave similar reasonable doubt instructions. Each instruction included language stating that the state must “eliminate all reasonable doubt” or similar phrasing. Notably, defense counsel for two defendants actually requested this specific language in their proposed jury instructions, and Austin’s counsel only objected to using “eliminate” instead of “obviate.”

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was whether jury instructions containing the phrase “eliminate all reasonable doubt” violate due process rights in light of the court’s previous decision in State v. Reyes. The defendants argued these instructions incorrectly stated the law and created constitutional error.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court applied the Victor test from Victor v. Nebraska, which requires that jury instructions “taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt.” The court emphasized that individual words or phrases “cannot be sequestered from their surroundings” and must be evaluated in context. While the court did not endorse using “eliminate” or “obviate” language, it found no constitutional error when the complete instruction properly conveyed the reasonable doubt standard.

Practice Implications

This decision clarifies that Utah courts will evaluate jury instructions holistically rather than focusing on isolated problematic phrases. Practitioners should analyze whether instructions create “a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction based on proof” below the constitutional standard. The ruling also demonstrates the importance of proper preservation of error—here, defendants’ failure to object meaningfully at trial complicated their appellate arguments.