When does the referendum filing deadline begin in Utah? Bissland v. Bankhead Explained

Background and Facts

Providence City residents attempted to challenge an annexation ordinance through the referendum process. The city council passed the ordinance on October 24, 2006, but the annexation agreement contained flawed language that needed correction. The petitioners filed a GRAMA request for the executed ordinance and received it on November 16, 2006. However, they did not submit their referendum petition until January 2, 2007—nearly one month after the December 8 statutory deadline. The city recorder refused to place the referendum on the ballot, and petitioners sued, claiming the filing period should begin when the ordinance was posted in final form rather than when passed.

Key Legal Issues

The central issue was interpreting Utah Code section 20A-7-601(3)(a), which requires referendum sponsors to file within forty-five days “after the passage of the local law.” Petitioners argued “passage” should include subsequent ministerial acts like signing and posting. A secondary issue involved whether due process required tolling the deadline due to inadequate notice of the ordinance.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ interpretation, holding that “passage” refers to the legislative act of voting favorably on proposed legislation, not subsequent ministerial formalities. The court emphasized that “passage connotes an act of collective assent and excludes the acts of those whose assent is not required.” The court found the statutory language clear and unambiguous, requiring effect be given to its plain meaning. Regarding due process, the court noted that while inadequate notice might justify tolling the deadline, petitioners presented no factual proof that notice was inadequate or that twenty-one days between posting and deadline was insufficient.

Practice Implications

This decision establishes that referendum deadlines run from the date of legislative passage, regardless of subsequent ministerial acts. Practitioners advising clients on referendum efforts must calculate the forty-five-day filing period from the actual vote, not from signing or posting dates. The ruling also demonstrates that due process challenges based on inadequate notice require factual proof rather than assumptions about truncated timeframes.