Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Does a witness’s brief mention of past violence mean a new trial? State v. Yalowski

2017 UT App 177No. 20150270-CADecided Sep 21, 2017Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

A brief, unsolicited, undetailed reference to the defendant’s past violence did not require a mistrial; excluding cross-examination about a dismissed plea in abeyance and an uncharged arrest was within the court’s rule 608(b) discretion and harmless; and a non-expert technician’s shoeprint comparison based on personal observation was proper rule 701 lay opinion under State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190–91 (Utah 1987).

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld Yalowski’s convictions for burglary, threat of violence, and criminal mischief.

  • A short, unprompted mention of a defendant’s past violence that is not repeated or explained did not require a new trial here.
  • A trial judge has wide room to limit questions about a witness’s past bad acts that did not end in a conviction.
  • A witness who is not an expert may still say that shoeprints he photographed look like the defendant’s shoes, if the opinion rests on what he saw and helps the jury.

What happened?

The victim and the defendant, Russell Edward Yalowski, had dated for about a year and broken up. On December 20, 2013, she was in the bathtub when she heard two loud bangs. When she opened the shower curtain, he was standing in the bathroom. He said he had people outside “waiting to shoot up the house” and urinated on the walls.

Police arrested him outside. He had keys to her house and car that she said she never gave him. The back door and bathroom door were damaged, and shoe impressions were photographed in the snow and on the door. A jury convicted him of burglary, threat of violence, and criminal mischief, and acquitted him of lewdness.

What did he argue on appeal?

He raised three main complaints and a fourth that the errors added up together. First, the victim told the jury he had been “Getting violent,” even though the parties had agreed no prior violence would come in. He asked for a mistrial, which means ending the trial and starting over, and the judge said no.

Second, the judge would not let him ask the victim about a plea in abeyance (a plea put on hold that can later be dismissed) or an arrest. Third, a forensic technician who was not an expert told the jury the tread on his shoes looked “Identical” to the prints.

Why didn’t the comment about violence require a new trial?

The court said the remark was brief, came up on its own rather than from the prosecutor’s question, gave no details, and was never repeated. The prosecutor moved right on to who ended the relationship. Other witnesses gave plenty of evidence of the crimes, so the remark did not harm him.

Why couldn’t he ask about the plea and the arrest?

He argued on appeal that these events showed the victim had a reason to lie. The court said he never made that argument to the trial judge, so it would not consider it. His backup argument that the judge plainly erred was too thinly explained to consider.

On the argument he did make, that the events showed she was untruthful, the court said the judge had room to say no. The arrest had not led to charges and the plea had been dismissed, which made them less useful. He was allowed to ask about her using someone else’s identification to visit him in jail. And her story was backed up by her cousin, the officers, and the physical evidence, so limiting the questions did no harm.

Was the shoeprint testimony allowed?

Yes. A non-expert may give an opinion based on what he personally saw if it helps the jury. The technician took the photographs, said he was not testifying as an expert, and the jury had the photos to judge for itself. Another officer gave nearly the same testimony without challenge, so any error would have been harmless.

What happens now?

Nothing more in this case. Because the court found no error, or no harm from any possible error, the claim that the errors added up also failed. The convictions stand.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Mortensen, J., joined by Christiansen and Toomey, JJ.). Yalowski was convicted by a jury of burglary, threat of violence, and criminal mischief (¶¶ 1, 12). The court rejected each challenge and the cumulative error claim (¶¶ 41–42).

Issue 1: Mistrial for prior-violence remark (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 17–22): affirmed (no error)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial after the victim said Yalowski had been “Getting violent.” The remark was not elicited by the prosecutor, gave no details, and was not dwelt on; the prosecutor immediately redirected to who ended the relationship (¶¶ 18, 20). The court relied on State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988), and State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 46, 24 P.3d 948, noting the two words were buried in more than 200 transcript pages and the other evidence was more than sufficient (¶¶ 19, 21–22). No limiting instruction was requested (¶ 20 n.3).

Issue 2: Rule 608(c) motive theory (none stated, ¶¶ 24–25): not reached

The rule 608(c) bias argument was unpreserved. Trial counsel sought the cross-examination as conduct “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,” which tracks rule 608(b), not 608(c) (¶ 25), citing State v. Crabb, 2011 UT App 440, ¶ 2, 268 P.3d 193 (per curiam) (¶ 24). The one-paragraph plain-error argument did not address rule 608(c) specifically and was inadequately briefed (¶ 25 n.4).

Issue 3: Rule 608(b) cross-examination limits (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 26–31): affirmed (no error)

Barring questions about a dismissed plea in abeyance and an uncharged arrest was within the court’s discretion. Following State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, ¶ 9, 141 P.3d 614, the court noted no party is entitled to inquire into prior bad acts, and that the lack of charges and the dismissal lessened probative value (¶¶ 26–27). The record did not show a rule 403 ruling; the court allowed questioning on the recent false-identification incident, and the court found the unexplained distinction “curious” but within discretion (¶ 28 & n.5). Any error was harmless: the victim was corroborated by her cousin, officers, and physical evidence (¶¶ 29–31).

Issue 4: Technician’s shoeprint opinion (abuse of discretion, ¶¶ 32–39): affirmed (no error)

The technician’s testimony that the tread patterns appeared “Identical” was proper lay opinion under rule 701. Under State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190–91 (Utah 1987), helpful lay testimony based on personal observation does not become expert opinion simply because the question “might be capable of scientific determination” (¶¶ 34–37). He disclaimed expertise, and the jury had the photographs (¶ 37). Nearly identical unchallenged testimony from the backup officer made any error harmless (¶¶ 38–39). The court doubted preservation but resolved the issue on the merits (¶ 34 n.7).

Issue 5: Cumulative error (none stated, ¶ 40): affirmed (no error)

With no error or only harmless error in every instance, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply, citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993), and State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ¶ 74, 125 P.3d 878 (¶ 40).

Takeaways

  • An unsolicited, undetailed, unrepeated reference to prior violence may not warrant a mistrial where the prosecutor moves on and other evidence is strong (¶¶ 20–22).
  • Arguing “probative of truthfulness” preserves rule 608(b) only, not a rule 608(c) bias theory (¶¶ 24–25).
  • A dismissed charge or uncharged arrest carries reduced probative value for rule 608(b) cross-examination (¶ 27).
  • Cumulative, unchallenged testimony from another witness can render admission of lay opinion harmless (¶ 38).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Yalowski
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2017 UT App 177
Case no.
20150270-CA
Filed
2015
Decided
September 21, 2017
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Yalowski
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Jury convictions for burglary, threat of violence, and criminal mischief after the defendant entered his ex-girlfriend's house

The panel

David N. MortensenAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Kate A. ToomeyConcurred
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Paul B. Parker

Parties & counsel

Yalowski — AppellantIndividual(s)Alexandra S. McCallum
State — AppelleeState of UtahSean D. ReyesLaura B. DupaixJeanne B. Inouye

Practice Tip

When seeking to impeach a witness with prior conduct, name each theory in the trial court; asking under rule 608 for conduct "probative of truthfulness" preserved only rule 608(b), not a rule 608(c) bias argument (¶¶ 24–25).

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