Do independent medical examiners owe a duty of care to examinees? Kirk v. Anderson Explained

In Kirk v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether independent medical examiners (IMEs) owe a duty of care to the individuals they examine, particularly in workers’ compensation cases. The court’s decision provides crucial guidance for practitioners handling medical malpractice and workers’ compensation disputes.

Background and Facts

Jeremy Kirk was injured in a work-related car accident and filed for workers’ compensation benefits. Broadspire Services arranged for Dr. Mark Anderson to conduct an independent medical examination to evaluate Kirk’s claim. Anderson concluded that Kirk suffered only a transient cervical strain, with other symptoms related to pre-existing conditions. Based on this report, Broadspire denied various benefits. Three years later, the Utah Labor Commission determined Kirk was entitled to benefits for multiple injuries, including an ACL tear and spine aggravation. Kirk then sued Anderson and Broadspire for negligence, claiming the allegedly erroneous IME caused delays in his workers’ compensation proceedings.

Key Legal Issues

The court examined two potential bases for establishing a duty of care: first, whether a limited physician-patient relationship exists between IME examiners and examinees; and second, whether health care providers owe limited duties to non-patients arising from affirmative acts. The court applied the five-factor Jeffs test to analyze duty in tort cases involving health care providers and non-patients.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The court rejected both arguments for establishing duty. Regarding the physician-patient relationship, the court adopted the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Joseph v. McCann that no such relationship exists in IME contexts. The court emphasized that IMEs are conducted for evaluation purposes, not treatment, and Anderson explicitly disclaimed any doctor-patient relationship. The court also found no express or implied contract existed between Kirk and Anderson. On the second argument, while acknowledging that duties may exist in certain circumstances under Jeffs, the court declined to extend liability to harm flowing from delays in legal proceedings. The court’s analysis focused heavily on the fifth Jeffs factor—general policy considerations—finding that imposing such duty would chill expert testimony and disrupt valuable examination systems.

Practice Implications

This decision provides significant protection for independent medical examiners and other experts whose professional opinions may delay legal proceedings. However, the court expressly left open the possibility that IME examiners may owe limited duties in other circumstances, such as avoiding physical harm during examinations. Practitioners should note the distinction between direct physical injury during examination (which may create liability) and economic harm from delayed proceedings based on professional opinions (which does not). The decision also reinforces the importance of clear disclaimers regarding the absence of physician-patient relationships in IME contexts.