Does rule 4(f)'s criminal reinstatement process apply to PCRA appeals in Utah? Reyos v. State Explained

Background and facts

Frank Reyos was convicted of aggravated murder and a related gun offense. After the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, Reyos filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under Utah’s Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). The district court granted summary judgment to the State and dismissed the petition in March 2019. Reyos did not appeal. He instead sought federal habeas corpus relief, which was denied in 2022 because he had failed to exhaust state remedies by not appealing the PCRA dismissal. In January 2024—nearly five years after the PCRA dismissal—Reyos moved the district court to reinstate his time to file a direct appeal of that dismissal.

Key legal issues

The dispositive question was which provision of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 governed the motion to reinstate. Rule 4(g) applies to civil cases and, at all relevant times, required a motion to reinstate to be filed within one year of the entry of judgment. Rule 4(f), which codified the process established in Manning v. State, applies to criminal cases and—under the January 2024 version in effect when Reyos filed—imposed no time limit on such motions. Reyos argued that PCRA proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and that rule 4(f) should therefore apply, exempting him from the one-year bar. The State countered that Utah Code section 78B-9-102(1)(a) expressly declares PCRA proceedings to be civil.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court on two independent grounds. First, the Court held that Reyos failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal because his opening brief did not engage with—let alone rebut—the district court’s reasoning that PCRA proceedings are civil under rule 4. Instead, Reyos catalogued habeas corpus history and advanced a new request to eliminate all deadlines for postconviction appeals, neither of which addressed the district court’s rule 4(g) analysis. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. Second, the Court declined to reach Reyos’s constitutional argument—invoking the Suspension Clause, the Open Courts Provision, Due Process, the Right to Appeal, and Separation of Powers—because it was unpreserved. Below, Reyos had invoked constitutional principles only in service of his quasi-criminal theory; he never developed the distinct argument that the constitution categorically bars any deadline on postconviction appeals. Mere mention of a constitutional right or phrase does not preserve a constitutional claim.

Practice implications

This decision carries several important lessons for Utah appellate practitioners. An appellant’s opening brief must squarely confront the district court’s specific rationale—recycling district court briefing or pivoting to a new theory on appeal is fatal. Constitutional arguments must be specifically developed below, not merely mentioned; a vague invocation of habeas corpus or due process will not preserve a distinct constitutional theory for appellate review. Practitioners handling PCRA matters should also note that rule 4(f) was amended effective May 1, 2024 to impose a one-year-or-reasonable-time deadline even in criminal reinstatement motions, narrowing the gap between rules 4(f) and 4(g). Finally, the Court reiterated its preference for addressing procedural rule changes through the formal rulemaking process rather than through individual appeals.