Utah Court of Appeals
Can postnuptial agreements in Utah override statutory child support guidelines? Reese v. Reese Explained
Summary
Kylan Reese filed a rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a child support provision from his 2021 divorce decree, claiming it was void because it incorporated terms from a postnuptial agreement that exceeded statutory guidelines. The district court denied the motion, finding the provision was not void.
Analysis
Background and Facts
MaKaibree and Kylan Reese divorced in 2021 following an uncontested proceeding. In 2017, during their marriage, they had executed a postnuptial agreement requiring Kylan to pay monthly child support of either $2,500 or half his monthly salary, whichever was greater, in the event of divorce. This provision was incorporated into their divorce decree. Years later, Kylan realized he was paying more than double what he would owe under applicable statutory guidelines and filed a rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the child support provision as void.
Key Legal Issues
The central issue was whether Utah Code § 81-3-203(2), which prohibits premarital agreements from affecting a child’s right to support, also applies to postnuptial agreements. Kylan argued the child support provision was void ab initio because it violated this statutory prohibition. The court also addressed the narrow circumstances under which a judgment may be considered void under rule 60(b)(4).
Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. The court applied the correctness standard of review for rule 60(b)(4) motions challenging judgments as void. The court held that Utah Code § 81-3-203(2) applies only to “premarital agreements” by its plain terms and does not extend to postnuptial agreements. The court emphasized that statutory language should not be rewritten on policy grounds when the text is clear. Additionally, the court noted that Utah law permits parties to agree to child support amounts exceeding statutory guidelines.
Practice Implications
This decision clarifies that Utah’s restrictions on agreements affecting child support apply only to premarital agreements, not postnuptial agreements executed during marriage. Practitioners should carefully distinguish between these agreement types when advising clients. The ruling also reinforces that void judgments are narrowly construed and typically involve jurisdictional defects or due process violations, not disagreements with substantive terms that were validly agreed upon.
Case Details
Case Name
Reese v. Reese
Citation
2026 UT App 31
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Case Number
No. 20240830-CA
Date Decided
March 5, 2026
Outcome
Affirmed
Holding
A postnuptial agreement providing for child support that exceeds statutory guidelines is not void under Utah Code § 81-3-203(2), which applies only to premarital agreements.
Standard of Review
Correctness for rule 60(b)(4) motions seeking to set aside a judgment as void
Practice Tip
When challenging child support provisions on voidness grounds, ensure the statutory prohibition actually applies to the type of agreement at issue—Utah Code § 81-3-203(2) applies only to premarital agreements, not postnuptial agreements.
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