What standard applies when reviewing agency determinations under the special errand exception? Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah Explained

In Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard of review for agency determinations involving the special errand exception to workers’ compensation coverage, providing important guidance for practitioners challenging Industrial Commission decisions.

Background and Facts

Barbara Drake worked for FHP as a referral coordinator in Salt Lake City. Due to courier delays, her supervisor asked her to pick up referrals from the Ogden office two to three times weekly on her way home, requiring a five-to-six-mile detour. Drake received no additional compensation for these deliveries. After dropping off referrals at the Ogden office, Drake was injured in a car accident while driving to pick up her children. The Industrial Commission denied workers’ compensation benefits, finding the deliveries were part of Drake’s regular duties rather than a special errand. The court of appeals reversed, applying a correctness standard and finding the activities constituted a special errand.

Key Legal Issues

The primary issue was what standard of review courts should apply when reviewing agency determinations about whether employee activities constitute a “special errand” under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also addressed substantive factors for determining when regular activities may still qualify as special errands under the going and coming rule.

Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Utah Supreme Court held that while legal questions receive correctness review, the Industrial Commission’s application of the special errand standard to particular facts deserves deference. The Court reasoned that scope-of-employment issues are highly fact-dependent, and courts cannot formulate comprehensive rules to address all potential factual scenarios. Drawing on Pena, the Court concluded that fact-specific legal determinations fall on a spectrum between correctness and abuse of discretion review. Applying Larson’s treatise factors—including regularity, onerousness of travel, and urgency—the Court found the Commission reasonably concluded Drake’s regular deliveries were not special errands but part of her normal duties.

Practice Implications

This decision demonstrates the importance of characterizing issues properly on appeal. When challenging Industrial Commission determinations involving fact-specific legal standards, practitioners should argue the agency exceeded reasonableness bounds rather than seeking correctness review. The decision also provides substantive guidance on special errand analysis, emphasizing that regularity creates a strong presumption against finding activities “special,” though other factors like burden and employer benefit remain relevant.