Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I take back refusing a breath test? Johansson v. Rolfe

2011 UT App 182No. 20110105-CADecided Jun 9, 2011Administrative & GovernmentAffirmed

Holding

The district court’s findings after a trial de novo that the driver was adequately advised of the consequences of refusal and refused a breath test were not clearly erroneous, and his rescission argument failed because the court found he never asked to test after refusing.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the Driver Control Bureau chief and upheld the district court’s ruling that Johansson refused a breath test.

  • The court deferred to the district court, which believed the officer’s account over the driver’s on the warning and the refusal.
  • Johansson’s argument that he could take back his refusal failed because the district court found he never asked to take the test after refusing.
  • Under the Utah statute the court quoted, a driver asked to take a chemical test may not choose which test is given.

What happened?

Pete Johansson’s driver license was suspended in an administrative proceeding after he refused a breath test. He asked the district court to hear the case again from the start, a “trial de novo.” He agreed that the only question was whether he refused the test after a fair explanation of Utah’s implied consent law, the law that treats drivers as having agreed to chemical testing.

Nanette Rolfe, Bureau Chief of the Driver Control Bureau, was the respondent defending the suspension.

What did the witnesses say?

Officer Wind testified that Johansson first agreed to a breath test. About a minute later, Johansson asked whether the machine would come to the scene. When told it would, he refused. The officer said he read the refusal warning word for word from the DUI Report Form.

Johansson denied being told the consequences of refusing. He said he did not trust a machine driven around in a patrol car, but he agreed he said, “The machine comes here? Then, I refuse.” He testified he would have agreed to a breath test if he had known there was a machine at the police station. The officer denied that Johansson asked for a test there.

What did the district court decide?

It found that Johansson was clearly warned about the consequences of refusing and that he refused. It also concluded that under Utah law a clear refusal followed by a change of mind is still a refusal.

What did Johansson argue on appeal?

He challenged those findings. He had also urged the district court to follow a Kansas case, Standish v. Department of Revenue, 683 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1984), which allows a driver to take back a refusal.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It affirmed. The court gives weight to the trial judge’s view of the evidence unless the judge got the law wrong or the findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Here the findings on the warning and the refusal were not clearly wrong.

The Kansas case did not help. Even under that case, the district court would first have had to find that Johansson tried to take back his refusal. The court made no such finding, because it believed the officer’s testimony that Johansson never asked for a test afterward. The court also pointed to Utah cases holding that a later request did not undo a refusal, and to the statute saying a driver “may not select the test or tests to be administered.”

What happens now?

Nothing more. The district court’s decision stands.

What should people take from this?

When the case turns on who is believed, an appeals court rarely second-guesses the trial judge. Here the officer’s account of the warning and the refusal decided the case.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; McHugh, Thorne, and Christiansen, JJ.), on the appellee’s motion for summary disposition (¶ 1). The district court’s findings that Johansson was adequately and clearly advised of the consequences of refusal and that he refused a breath test are not clearly erroneous and do not misapply Utah law (¶¶ 3, 5).

Issue 1: Refusal finding and rescission (clearly erroneous, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The findings of adequate advisement and refusal stand, and the rescission argument fails on the facts as found. Review of a trial de novo on a license suspension defers to the trial court’s view of the evidence unless it misapplied the law or its findings are “clearly against the weight of the evidence” (¶ 2). Whether the officer sufficiently explained the implied consent obligation is for the factfinder, Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 1979), and refusal is judged by an objective test, *id.* at 1333 (¶ 2). Johansson stipulated that the only issue was whether he refused after a fair explanation of Utah Code section 41-6a-520 (¶ 2).

The officer testified he read the refusal admonition verbatim and that Johansson refused after learning the intoxilyzer would come to the scene; Johansson admitted saying, “The machine comes here? Then, I refuse” (¶ 3). With deference to the district court, the findings are not clearly erroneous (¶ 3).

On rescission, Johansson relied on Standish v. Department of Revenue, 683 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1984). Even that case would require a finding that he attempted to rescind, and the district court credited the officer’s testimony that he never asked to test after refusing (¶ 4). The court noted the district court’s conclusion that a clear refusal followed by a change of mind is still a refusal, citing Whitehouse v. Schwendiman, 723 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), Baker v. Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah 1986), and section 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i)’s “immediately request” language (¶ 4). It also cited section 41-6a-520(1)(d)(i), under which a driver may not select the test, and (1)(d)(ii), under which an officer’s failure to arrange a specific test is not a defense (¶ 4).

Takeaways

  • A trial de novo on a license suspension is reviewed deferentially; credibility contests over the admonition and refusal will rarely succeed on appeal (¶¶ 2–3).
  • A rescission theory needs a factual finding that the driver tried to rescind; without it, the argument fails regardless of which rule applies (¶ 4).
  • The court cited section 41-6a-520(1)(d)(i): a driver asked to submit to a chemical test may not select the test (¶ 4).
Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Johansson v. Rolfe
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 182
Case no.
20110105-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
June 9, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Johansson
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
An administrative driver license suspension based on a refusal to take a breath test

The panel

Michele M. Christiansen ForsterPer curiam
William A. Thorne Jr.Per curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department · Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Parties & counsel

Johansson — AppellantIndividual(s)Jason A. Schatz
Rolfe — AppelleeGovernment agencyMark L. ShurtleffNancy L. Kemp

Practice Tip

Before arguing that a driver rescinded a refusal, make sure the record supports a finding that the driver actually asked to test after refusing; the court rejected the argument here for want of that finding (¶ 4).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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