Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Is there a one-year deadline to challenge a parole hearing? Nicolds v. Board of Pardons and Parole

2012 UT App 123No. 20110150-CADecided Apr 26, 2012Post-Conviction ReliefReversed & Remanded

Holding

A rule 65B(d) petition challenging the Board of Pardons is not subject to the PCRA’s one-year limitation period, and a finding that a near-four-year delay was unreasonable was clearly erroneous where the inmate reasonably relied on contract attorneys’ instructions about the filing deadline.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with Lary Nicolds, the inmate who appealed, and sent his petition back to the district court to be decided on its merits.

  • The one-year deadline in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act did not apply to this rule 65B(d) petition challenging the Board of Pardons.
  • Such petitions have no fixed deadline but should be filed within a reasonable time.
  • Here, the district court was clearly wrong to find unreasonable delay where Nicolds relied on the contract attorneys’ instructions about the deadline.

What happened?

Lary W. Nicolds is an inmate. On October 1, 2010, he filed a petition for extraordinary relief, a special request asking a court to step in when an agency like the Board of Pardons has gone beyond its powers or failed to do what the law requires. He challenged what the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole did at his original parole grant hearing on October 3, 2006.

The district court dismissed the petition as too late. It applied the one-year deadline in the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA), the law that governs most challenges to convictions after the fact. In the alternative, it ruled the petition was barred by laches, a rule that lets a court turn away a claim when a party waited too long and that delay hurt the other side.

Did the one-year deadline apply?

No. The Court of Appeals relied on Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995), where the Utah Supreme Court said these petitions “should be filed within a reasonable time” but have no fixed limitation period. So the district court was wrong to use the PCRA’s one-year deadline.

What about the delay?

Laches has two parts: the person bringing the claim was not diligent, and that lack of diligence caused harm. Nicolds said he relied on materials from the “contract attorneys” the Department of Corrections hires to help inmates. Those instructions said the deadline for this kind of petition was four years, and Nicolds put that statement in his petition.

The Court of Appeals held that, in these circumstances, the district court’s finding of unreasonable delay was clearly wrong. Nicolds reasonably relied on what the contract attorneys told him. The court decided the case on that first part of laches. It also pointed out that the district court made no specific findings on the second part, whether anyone was harmed by the delay.

What happens now?

The dismissal is reversed. The case goes back to the district court, which must decide the petition on its merits after the Board of Pardons is properly served with it.

What should people take from this?

The court did not say that four years is the deadline for these petitions. It said there is no fixed deadline, only a reasonable-time requirement, and that this particular delay was not shown to be unreasonable given what Nicolds was told. A court applying laches also needs findings that the delay caused harm.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded, per curiam (McHugh, P.J., Davis and Christiansen, JJ.). Nicolds, appearing pro se, appealed the dismissal of his rule 65B(d) petition challenging the Board of Pardons and Parole’s actions at his October 3, 2006 original parole grant hearing. The district court dismissed it under the PCRA’s one-year limitation period and, in the alternative, for laches (¶ 2). Both grounds fail, and the petition must be decided on its merits after service on the Board (¶¶ 3, 6–7).

Issue 1: Dismissal of the petition as untimely (mixed, ¶¶ 3–6): reversed

Neither the PCRA limitation period nor laches supported dismissal.

PCRA limitation period (¶ 3). Under Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995), petitions under rule 65B(d), formerly rule 65B(e), “should be filed within a reasonable time,” but “there is no fixed limitation period.” Applying Utah Code section 78B‐9‐107 was error.

Laches (¶¶ 4–6). Laches requires “(1) a party’s lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence,” Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐Day Saints v. Hon. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ¶ 27, 238 P.3d 1054; see also Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). The ruling presents mixed questions; legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and findings for clear error (¶ 4). Nicolds relied on instructions from the Department of Corrections’ contract attorneys stating a four-year limitation period for rule 65B(d) petitions, and he incorporated that statement into his petition (¶ 5). Under these circumstances, the finding of unreasonable delay was clearly erroneous because his reliance was reasonable (¶ 6). The court resolved the case on the first element but noted the district court made no specific findings on prejudice (¶ 6); see also Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, ¶ 8, 984 P.2d 392 (reversing laches where findings did not show prejudice) (¶ 4).

Disposition

The dismissal is reversed and the case remanded “for a determination of the petition on its merits after appropriate service on the Board of Pardons” (¶ 7).

Takeaways

  • The PCRA’s one-year period in section 78B‐9‐107 does not apply to a rule 65B(d) petition against the Board of Pardons; the test is filing within a reasonable time (¶ 3).
  • An inmate’s reasonable reliance on contract attorneys’ deadline instructions defeated a finding of unreasonable delay on these facts (¶¶ 5–6).
  • A laches dismissal needs findings on both lack of diligence and resulting injury; the court noted the absence of prejudice findings here (¶ 6).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
Nicolds v. Board of Pardons and Parole
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 123
Case no.
20110150-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
April 26, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Nicolds
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
At stake
An inmate's rule 65B(d) petition for extraordinary relief challenging the Board of Pardons and Parole's actions at his October 3, 2006 original parole grant hearing, dismissed as untimely

The panel

James Z. DavisPer curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Trial court
Sixth District Court, Manti Department · Judge Marvin D. Bagley

Parties & counsel

Nicolds — AppellantIndividual(s)Self-represented
Board of Pardons and Parole — AppelleeGovernment agency

Practice Tip

When the State or Board seeks dismissal of a rule 65B(d) petition as untimely, the question is reasonable time and laches, not the PCRA's one-year period, and laches requires findings on both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice (¶¶ 3–6).

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Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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