Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

If my felony is reduced to a misdemeanor, is my old sentence reduced too? State v. Oseguera

2011 UT App 417No. 20110274-CADecided Dec 8, 2011Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Utah Code section 76-3-402(2) authorizes a court, after a defendant’s successful discharge from probation, to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense but, unlike subsection (1), does not authorize it to impose a new sentence, and the court lacks jurisdiction to alter a valid sentence once imposed (citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld the denial of Oseguera’s request to reduce the sentence he had already served.

  • Under Utah Code section 76-3-402(2), a court may lower the level of the offense after probation is completed, but that subsection does not let it change the sentence.
  • Once a valid sentence has been imposed, the district court loses jurisdiction (its power) to change it.
  • Oseguera received the offense reduction his plea agreement allowed him to ask for, and the court found nothing in the record showing the State broke that agreement.

What happened?

In 2002, Ramiro Oseguera Jr. pleaded guilty to theft, a third degree felony. In his plea agreement, the State agreed not to oppose “402(b) consideration upon completion of probation” and to go along with Adult Probation & Parole’s recommendation at sentencing.

The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of up to five years in prison. It then suspended that sentence and put him on probation. He finished probation on November 4, 2003.

In February 2010, almost seven years later, Oseguera asked the court to lower the level of his offense under Utah Code section 76-3-402(2). The State did not oppose the request, and the court reduced the offense to a class A misdemeanor.

What did Oseguera ask for next?

Ten months later, he filed a “Stipulated Emergency Motion to Clarify Judgment on 402 Motion.” He asked the court to reduce his original sentence, after the fact, to the sentence for a class A misdemeanor. The district court denied the motion, and he appealed.

What did the court decide?

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court decided the case on the briefs, without oral argument, in a per curiam decision, meaning one issued by the panel as a whole with no named author.

The statute has two parts. Subsection (1) applies at the original sentencing. It lets the court enter a conviction for the next lower degree of offense “and impose sentence accordingly.” Subsection (2) applies when a sentence was suspended and the defendant later finishes probation. It lets the court enter a conviction for the next lower degree of offense, but it does not include the words about imposing a sentence.

Under the plain meaning of subsection (2), Oseguera could get the level of his offense lowered, but he was not entitled to have the sentence he had already served reduced. The court also noted that once a valid sentence is imposed, the district court loses jurisdiction, meaning its legal power, to change it. Oseguera did not dispute that his sentence was valid when it was imposed.

Did the State break the plea deal?

Oseguera claimed the State had promised to recommend section 76-3-402 treatment at sentencing. The court said that was incorrect. The written plea statement referred to consideration after probation was completed, which is the provision now in subsection (2). The court said his claim that the State failed to keep the plea bargain was not supported by the district court record. He asked for the offense reduction without opposition from the State, and he got it.

What happens now?

Nothing more. The denial of the motion stands. Oseguera keeps the reduction of his offense to a class A misdemeanor, but his original sentence is not changed.

What should people take from this?

A reduction under section 76-3-402(2) after probation changes the level of the conviction. In this case, it did not reach back to change the sentence that had already been imposed and served.

Bottom line

Affirmed, per curiam (Orme, Voros, and Roth, JJ.), decided without oral argument under Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3) (¶ 1). After obtaining a reduction of his felony theft conviction to a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code section 76-3-402(2), Oseguera filed a “motion to clarify” seeking a retroactive reduction of his original sentence. Subsection (2) permits only a reduction of the offense level, not resentencing (¶¶ 4–5).

Issue 1: Retroactive sentence reduction under section 76-3-402(2) (none stated, ¶¶ 4–5): affirmed (no error)

The district court correctly denied the motion because section 76-3-402(2) does not authorize a reduction of a sentence already imposed and served.

Subsection (1) applies at the original sentencing and lets the court enter a conviction for the next lower degree “and impose sentence accordingly”; because sentence has not yet been imposed, the court has jurisdiction to do both (¶ 4). Subsection (2) applies after a suspended sentence and successful discharge from probation and authorizes only entry of “a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense,” without the sentencing language (¶¶ 4–5). The court relied on the plain meaning of subsection (2), and see also Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005), which describes subsection (2) as dealing “specifically with probation compliance” (¶ 5).

Independently, once a valid sentence is imposed, the district court loses jurisdiction to alter it. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (¶ 5). Oseguera did not dispute that his sentence was valid when imposed (¶ 5).

Plea agreement. The written plea statement said the State “will not oppose 402(b) consideration upon completion of probation,” a reference to what is now subsection (2). Oseguera’s characterization of a promise to recommend section 76-3-402 treatment at sentencing was incorrect, and any claim that the State breached the plea bargain is “not supported by the district court record” (¶ 2 n.2). He got the unopposed offense reduction the agreement contemplated (¶ 5).

Takeaways

  • Subsection 76-3-402(2) authorizes a lower-degree conviction after probation but, unlike subsection (1), does not authorize the court to “impose sentence accordingly” (¶¶ 4–5).
  • A post-probation reduction under subsection (2) does not entitle a defendant to a reduction of the sentence already served (¶ 5).
  • A district court lacks jurisdiction to alter a valid sentence once imposed, citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (¶ 5).
  • A claimed breach of a plea bargain fails where the written plea statement does not support it (¶ 2 n.2).

Case details

Case name
State v. Oseguera
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2011 UT App 417
Case no.
20110274-CA
Filed
2011
Decided
December 8, 2011
Opinion type
Per curiam
Heard
On briefs
Who appealed
Oseguera
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Whether a defendant whose felony theft offense was reduced to a class A misdemeanor after probation could also get a retroactive reduction of his original sentence

The panel

J. Frederic Voros, Jr.Per curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Second District Court, Ogden Department · Judge Noel S. Hyde

Parties & counsel

Oseguera — AppellantIndividual(s)Hakeem IsholaAaron Tarin
State — AppelleeState of UtahMark L. ShurtleffMichelle M. Young

Practice Tip

A section 76-3-402(2) reduction after probation lowers the degree of the conviction, but the court held it does not authorize a reduced sentence; any request to have the sentence reflect the lower degree belongs at the original sentencing under subsection (1) (¶¶ 4–5).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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