Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Can I get my child back from grandparents after agreeing to custody? In re A.S.A. (A.A.A. v. P.M and V.M.)

2012 UT App 151No. 20120186-CADecided May 24, 2012Juvenile & Child WelfareAffirmed

Holding

A juvenile court has jurisdiction over a case begun by a petition to terminate parental rights even if it ends in a stipulation, a parent’s stipulated transfer of custody in that child welfare proceeding extinguishes the parental presumption, and the “safely returned” and “substantial risk of detriment” standards of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(2) form a single inquiry.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeals sided with the grandparents and left in place the order keeping A.S.A. in their permanent custody and guardianship.

  • A juvenile court can hear a case that begins as a petition to terminate parental rights, even if it ends with a custody agreement instead.
  • A parent who agrees in a child welfare case to give up custody loses the parental presumption, the legal advantage a parent normally has over non-parents.
  • Witnesses who describe what they saw directly may give opinions without qualifying as experts.

What happened?

Grandparents filed a petition in juvenile court to end Mother’s parental rights to A.S.A., alleging abandonment and neglect. The court calls the mother “Mother” and the other parties “Grandparents.”

At the termination trial, Mother agreed (stipulated) that Grandparents would have guardianship and custody of A.S.A. Under that agreement, Mother took on what the court called the equivalent of a reunification service plan, a set of steps meant to help her gain the skills needed to parent A.S.A.

At a later permanency hearing, a hearing the law requires to decide whether a child can safely go home, the juvenile court found Mother had not met the plan’s goals. It kept A.S.A. with Grandparents permanently and denied Mother’s motions filed after the ruling.

What did Mother argue?

Mother argued that the juvenile court had no power to hear the case, that it ignored her parental presumption, that it used the wrong legal standard, and that it wrongly relied on two life coaches who were not qualified as experts.

Did the juvenile court have power to hear the case?

Yes. Juvenile courts have exclusive power over cases about abuse, neglect, and ending parental rights. Grandparents started this case with a petition to end Mother’s rights based on abandonment and neglect. That gave the juvenile court power over the case, even though it ended with an agreement rather than a termination.

What about Mother’s parental presumption?

The parental presumption is a legal rule that favors a parent over non-parents in custody disputes. The court held Mother lost it when she agreed to give Grandparents custody. It also explained that the presumption generally does not apply in child welfare cases, where the petition itself is enough to overcome it.

Did the court use the right standard?

Yes. The law asks whether the child “may safely be returned” to the parent. Part of that question is whether return would create a substantial risk of harm to the child. If a parent does not meet the goals of a court-approved plan, the law treats that as initial proof of that risk.

The juvenile court found Mother had not taken in the concepts she was taught, so she did not meet the plan’s goals. The Court of Appeals agreed with the juvenile court that the statute’s tests are really the same question, and held the right standards were applied.

What about the life coaches?

The life coaches were not expert witnesses. They gave ordinary opinion testimony based on what they saw directly, which the evidence rules allow, so the rules for experts did not apply. Mother also said they testified improperly about her religion, but the court noted the juvenile court did not give that testimony weight and based its findings on her conduct.

What happens now?

The order stands. A.S.A. remains in Grandparents’ permanent custody and guardianship. The court found Mother’s other arguments without merit and did not address them in writing.

Bottom line

Affirmed (per curiam; McHugh, P.J., Voros, A.P.J., and Orme, J.). Grandparents petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights; at the termination trial Mother stipulated to Grandparents’ guardianship and custody and undertook the equivalent of a reunification service plan. After a permanency hearing the juvenile court found A.S.A. could not safely be returned and denied Mother’s post-judgment motions. Each of Mother’s four challenges fails (¶¶ 2–6), and the rest are rejected as without merit (¶ 7).

Issue 1: Subject matter jurisdiction (none stated, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction. A court has subject matter jurisdiction over the types of cases it is empowered to hear (¶ 2, quoting Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 211). Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over abuse, neglect, dependency and termination proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(1)(c), (g) (2008), and Grandparents’ termination petition alleged abandonment and neglect (¶ 2). Jurisdiction held even though the termination trial ended in a stipulation rather than termination (¶ 2).

Issue 2: Legal test for the permanency order: parental presumption and “safely returned” standard (none stated, ¶¶ 3–5): affirmed (no error)

Mother had no parental presumption for Grandparents to rebut. Mother invoked Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982), but the presumption “is lost where a parent . . . has previously lost custody of a child,” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 68, 201 P.3d 985, and her voluntary transfer of custody in a child welfare proceeding extinguished it (¶ 3). Independently, the presumption generally does not apply in child welfare proceedings, where the petition alone overcomes it (¶ 3, citing In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 69, 201 P.3d 985).

The juvenile court applied the correct standard. The ultimate question under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(2)(a) is whether the child “may safely be returned”; substantial risk of detriment under § 78A-6-314(2)(b) is a consideration within that inquiry, and failure to meet service-plan goals is prima facie evidence of that risk under § 78A-6-314(2)(c) (¶¶ 4–5). The court agreed with the juvenile court that these are “really the same inquiry,” and the finding that Mother had not internalized the plan’s concepts supported the result (¶ 5).

Issue 3: Life coach testimony (none stated, ¶ 6): affirmed (no error)

The life coaches were lay witnesses, so rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), did not apply. They gave opinion testimony based on direct observation, as Utah Rule of Evidence 701 permits (¶ 6). Mother did not object at the hearing, but because the juvenile court addressed the issue in its post-judgment order, the court reached it (¶ 6 n.1, citing Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). The juvenile court gave no weight to testimony about Mother’s religion and based its findings on her conduct (¶ 6 n.2).

Not reached

Mother’s other issues were rejected as without merit and not addressed in writing (¶ 7, citing State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989)). In a footnote, the court added that it would not reweigh evidence where the findings have a foundation (In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435), and that Mother provided only a single transcript, so it would assume regularity under State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (¶ 7 n.3).

Takeaways

  • A stipulated transfer of custody in a child welfare proceeding extinguishes the parental presumption (¶ 3).
  • Failure to meet service-plan goals is prima facie evidence of substantial risk of detriment under § 78A-6-314(2)(c), feeding the “safely returned” determination (¶ 5).
  • Observational opinion testimony is governed by rule 701, not rule 702 or Daubert (¶ 6).
  • Supply transcripts of every hearing relied on; with only one, the court assumed regularity (¶ 7 n.3).

Utah cases relied on

Case details

Case name
In re A.S.A. (A.A.A. v. P.M and V.M.)
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2012 UT App 151
Case no.
20120186-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
May 24, 2012
Opinion type
Per curiam
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Whether A.S.A. would stay in the permanent custody and guardianship of Grandparents or be returned to Mother

The panel

J. Frederic Voros, Jr.Per curiam
Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Trial court
Second Juvenile Court, Farmington Department · Judge J. Mark Andrus

Parties & counsel

Appellant — AppellantIndividual(s)Jonathan G. Jemming
Appellee — AppelleeIndividual(s)F. Kevin BondBudge W. Call
Guardian ad litemOtherMartha Pierce

Practice Tip

A parent who stipulates to transfer custody in a child welfare proceeding loses the parental presumption under In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 68, 201 P.3d 985, so that consequence should be weighed before the stipulation is entered (¶ 3).

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Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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