Utah Court of Appeals · Per Curiam Opinion

Does assault with a weapon require intent to seriously injure? State v. Mangum

2013 UT App 292No. 20120346-CADecided Dec 12, 2013Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

Under the 2008 version of Utah Code section 76-5-103, a conviction for aggravated assault under the dangerous-weapon variant in subsection (1)(b) does not require proof of specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, because State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, 285 P.3d 1183, construed only the separate subsection (1)(a) variant.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with the State and upheld Mangum’s aggravated assault conviction.

  • When the trial evidence conflicts, the jury decides whom to believe, and an appeals court will generally not second-guess that choice.
  • Under the 2008 version of Utah’s aggravated assault statute, the dangerous-weapon form of the crime and the “intentionally causes serious bodily injury” form were separate versions of the offense.
  • The State did not have to prove intent to cause serious injury to convict under the dangerous-weapon form.

What happened?

Jamie Nichole Mangum was tried by a jury and convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. The charge came from an altercation in which the victim said Mangum stabbed her in the back. Mangum, the defendant, appealed. The State of Utah, which prosecuted her, defended the conviction.

What did Mangum argue?

She made two arguments. First, she said the evidence did not show she used a dangerous weapon and stabbed the victim. Second, she said that even if she did stab the victim, the State never proved she meant to cause serious bodily harm. She relied on State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, 285 P.3d 1183, a Utah Supreme Court case that required proof of intent to injure.

Was there enough evidence?

Yes. The victim testified that Mangum stabbed her and that she saw something shiny in Mangum’s hand. Evidence showed a stab wound between the victim’s spine and shoulder blade. A witness heard the victim scream “she stabbed me.” Mangum’s ex-husband testified that she called him afterward and admitted stabbing someone.

Mangum testified that she did not stab anyone and did not tell her ex-husband that she had. But the court explained that conflicting evidence is not enough to overturn a verdict. When the evidence conflicts, the jury decides which version to believe.

Did the State have to prove she meant to seriously hurt the victim?

No. The law in effect when Mangum was charged described aggravated assault in two ways. One was intentionally causing serious bodily injury, a second degree felony. The other was using a dangerous weapon, or other force likely to cause death or serious injury, a third degree felony.

The court said these are separate versions of the crime, with different elements (the facts the State must prove) and different punishments. The Hutchings case dealt with the first version. Mangum was charged and convicted under the second, weapon-based version. So Hutchings did not apply, and the State did not need to prove she specifically intended to cause injury.

The court also noted that the aggravated assault statute has since been amended.

What happens now?

Nothing more happens in this appeal. The court affirmed, meaning the conviction stands.

What should people take from this?

An appeal that rests on the defendant’s own denial, when the jury heard other evidence against her, faces a steep climb. And when a criminal statute has more than one version of a crime, the intent the State must prove depends on which version was charged.

Bottom line

Affirmed. Per curiam (Orme, McHugh, and Roth, JJ.). The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Mangum stabbed the victim (¶¶ 3–4). Under the 2008 version of Utah Code section 76-5-103(1), subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are separate variants of aggravated assault. A conviction under the dangerous-weapon variant in (1)(b) does not require the specific intent to injure that State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, 285 P.3d 1183, requires under (1)(a) (¶¶ 5–7). The statute has since been amended (¶ 1 n.1).

Issue 1: Sufficiency of the evidence (sufficiency of the evidence, ¶ 2): affirmed (no error)

The evidence was sufficient to show that Mangum used a dangerous weapon and stabbed the victim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court pointed to the victim’s testimony that Mangum stabbed her and that she saw something shiny in Mangum’s hand, evidence of the wound between the victim’s spine and scapula, a witness who heard the victim scream “she stabbed me,” and the ex-husband’s testimony that Mangum admitted the stabbing (¶ 3). Mangum’s denials did not change the result, because “contradictory evidence is not sufficient to overturn a jury verdict” (¶ 4, citing State v. Lucero, 2012 UT App 202, ¶ 13, 283 P.3d 594). The jury decides which evidence to believe (¶ 4, citing State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶ 40, 52 P.3d 1194); see also State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ¶ 25, 167 P.3d 1074 (presumption that the jury disbelieved conflicting evidence) (¶ 2).

Issue 2: Specific intent under Hutchings (none stated, ¶¶ 5–7): affirmed (no error)

The State did not have to prove specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to support a conviction under subsection (1)(b). Subsection (1)(a) (intentionally causing serious bodily injury, a second degree felony) and subsection (1)(b) (using a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, a third degree felony) are “clearly separate variants” with different elements and punishments (¶¶ 6–7). The State need not prove the elements of both variants, see State v. Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ¶ 12 (¶ 7). State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 14 construed only subsection (1)(a); Mangum was charged and convicted under (1)(b), so Hutchings does not apply (¶¶ 5, 7).

Takeaways

  • A defendant’s denial at trial does not make the evidence insufficient when other evidence supports the verdict; credibility is for the jury (¶ 4).
  • Under the 2008 statute, the Hutchings specific-intent requirement attaches to subsection (1)(a), not to a dangerous-weapon conviction under (1)(b) (¶ 7).
  • Before relying on an intent holding, check which subsection of the statute the holding construed and which subsection the client was charged under (¶¶ 5–7).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Mangum
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2013 UT App 292
Case no.
20120346-CA
Filed
2012
Decided
December 12, 2013
Opinion type
Per curiam
Who appealed
Mangum
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
A third degree felony conviction for aggravated assault based on use of a dangerous weapon

The panel

Carolyn B. McHughPer curiam
Gregory K. OrmePer curiam
Stephen L. RothPer curiam
Trial court
Third District Court, West Jordan Department · Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Parties & counsel

Mangum — AppellantIndividual(s)Debra M. NelsonWesley J. Howard
State — AppelleeState of UtahBrian L. TarbetRyan D. Tenney

Practice Tip

Before arguing an intent requirement from a case like State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 14, confirm that the case construed the same subsection of the statute your client was charged under; separate variants carry separate elements (¶ 7).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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