Can a written plea agreement substitute for the district court's oral advisement that it is not bound by sentencing recommendations? State v. Prestwich Explained

Background and facts

After law enforcement discovered child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) on his computer, Kent Prestwich was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. He pleaded guilty to two counts under a written plea agreement that called for a suspended prison sentence, 200 days in jail, and 48 months of probation. The agreement included a bolded joint sentencing recommendation alongside a conspicuous judge-not-bound advisory — a paragraph expressly warning that “the judge is bound only by the law, not by anyone’s recommendation or prediction.” At the change-of-plea hearing, Prestwich confirmed he had reviewed the agreement and had no questions, but the district court never orally advised him that it was not bound by the recommendation. The court ultimately rejected the joint recommendation and imposed concurrent prison terms of one to fifteen years per count.

Key legal issues

Prestwich raised five issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court’s failure to orally advise him of the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary under plain error review; (2) whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek advance judicial approval of the plea agreement under rule 11(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) whether the district court plainly erred by failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte; (4) whether the sentence was illegal under rule 22(e); and (5) whether the court abused its discretion at sentencing.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed on all grounds. On the plea-voluntariness issue, the court reaffirmed that district courts are not constitutionally required to comply with rule 11, and that the ultimate inquiry is whether the defendant knew of his constitutional rights and fully understood the charges. Because the written agreement unambiguously conveyed the nonbinding nature of the recommendation — including a direct statement that “the judge alone will determine [the] sentence” — and Prestwich confirmed he understood the agreement, his plea was knowing and voluntary. The court declined to resolve whether rule 11(h)(2)’s requirement to “advise the defendant personally” demands oral advisement, finding the question unnecessary.

On ineffective assistance, the court bypassed the deficiency prong and rejected the claim for lack of prejudice: given Prestwich’s confession spanning fifteen years of CSAM viewing and his possession of numerous files, conviction at trial on all ten counts would have been “all but inevitable,” making rejection of the plea bargain irrational. On competency, the court held that neither Prestwich’s history of mental illness nor his erroneous minimization of victim harm raised a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency, particularly where the plea colloquy showed him coherent and responsive. The rule 22(e) claim was dismissed as an impermissible veiled challenge to the underlying conviction. Finally, the court held the district court did not abuse its wide sentencing discretion in imposing the presumptive prison term for second-degree felonies based on Prestwich’s long-standing conduct, sexual attraction to children, and minimization of victim harm.

Practice implications

Practitioners negotiating plea agreements should treat the written judge-not-bound advisory as a critical safeguard — not merely boilerplate. This case confirms that a comprehensive written disclosure, when acknowledged by the defendant at the plea colloquy, can independently establish a knowing and voluntary plea even without the oral advisement contemplated by rule 11(h)(2). Counsel should also note the court’s application of State v. Mullins, 2025 UT 57, which now requires defendants challenging sentence legality under rule 22(e) to first file a motion in the district court — failure to do so will forfeit the claim absent a recognized exception to preservation.