Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Can a jury convict on a different act than the charges described? State v. Talbert

2026 UT App 97No. 20240192-CADecided Jun 25, 2026Criminal AppealsAffirmed

Holding

A variance between the act alleged in the information and the act proved at trial does not defeat a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction; under State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), failure to seek a continuance waives notice and procedural due process claims but not sufficiency challenges, and Talbert’s unpreserved variance claim failed under plain error and ineffective assistance.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld all of Talbert’s convictions and rejected every argument he raised on appeal.

  • Testimony about uncharged sexual acts against the same child can be part of the story of the charged crimes, so a defense lawyer was not ineffective for not objecting to it here.
  • Changing a jury instruction is not the same as changing the charging document; an information is amended only when the court allows it.
  • A defendant who does not ask for a continuance after learning of a gap between the charges and the evidence gives up complaints about lack of notice, but can still challenge whether the evidence was enough.

What happened?

Talbert was convicted by a jury of crimes against his stepchild, whom the court calls Taylor, a made-up name. The charges were two counts of object rape, three counts of forcible sodomy, and one count of forcible sexual abuse. On Count 6, the jury acquitted him of forcible sodomy but convicted him of a lesser crime, forcible sexual abuse.

The charging document (called the information) said Count 2 was based on touching Taylor’s genitals over clothing. On the first day of trial, both sides agreed to change the jury instruction describing the charges to add touching of the breast. The prosecutor then asked the jury to convict on Count 2 based on a breast-touching incident, and the jury did.

What did Talbert argue?

He argued his lawyer should have objected to testimony about uncharged acts. He argued the mismatch on Count 2 meant the trial court lacked power over that count, denied him fair notice, and left the State without proof of what it charged. He also argued the evidence did not show his penis was involved in the Count 6 incident.

What did the court decide about the uncharged acts?

The court held his lawyer was not ineffective, meaning his performance did not fall below what the Constitution requires. Evidence of uncharged sexual acts against the same child can be admitted as background showing how the abuser groomed the victim. A lawyer could reasonably think an objection would fail, and lawyers are not faulted for skipping objections that would fail.

What about Count 2?

First, the court rejected the State’s claim that the information had been “effectively amended” by changing the jury instruction. Only the court can allow an amendment, and no one asked it to.

Second, the trial court had power over the whole case once the information was properly filed. A mismatch between the charges and the proof does not take that power away.

Third, because Talbert never asked the trial court to postpone the trial to deal with the mismatch, he gave up any complaint about notice or procedural due process (the right to fair procedures).

Fourth, his lawyer’s one-sentence motion for a directed verdict (asking the judge to end a charge for lack of evidence) did not raise the mismatch, so the issue was not properly raised. The court still looked at it. Any error was not obvious to the judge, and the lawyer was not ineffective. Had he pressed the point, the State could have pointed to other testimony of genital touching or asked to amend the information, and that request could reasonably have been expected to succeed.

What about Count 6?

Taylor did not see the object, but felt no fingernail, saw Talbert putting his pants back on, and told a nurse it could have been his penis. That was enough for a jury to infer it was. And the jury convicted him only of a lesser crime that does not require that proof.

What happens now?

Nothing goes back to the trial court. All of the convictions stand.

What should people take from this?

When the charges and the trial evidence do not match, how and when the defense raises it matters. The court treated a failure to ask for a continuance as giving up notice complaints, and a bare directed verdict motion as too vague to raise the mismatch.

Bottom line

Affirmed (Harris, J., joined by Christiansen Forster and Oliver, JJ.). Talbert’s six convictions for sexual offenses against his stepchild stand (¶ 88). The core of the opinion addresses a variance on Count 2: the information alleged genital touching, but after a stipulated change to the instruction describing the charges, the State elected a breast-touching incident (¶¶ 16–17, 22, 33).

Issue 2: Rule 404(b) objection to uncharged acts (ineffective assistance, ¶¶ 27–31): affirmed (no error)

Counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting to testimony about uncharged breast touching, nipple pulling and kissing/biting. Rule 404(b) does not reach intrinsic evidence, citing State v. Blackwing, 2025 UT 60, ¶ 29, 582 P.3d 829, and uncharged conduct against the same child that shows grooming is intrinsic under State v. Newberry, 2026 UT App 2, ¶ 47, 584 P.3d 343 (¶¶ 30–31). An objection would have been futile (¶ 31).

Issue 3: Subject matter jurisdiction over Count 2 (correctness, ¶ 25): affirmed (no error)

The variance did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Once an information is properly filed, the court has jurisdiction over the entire case; the inquiry is “not that granular” (¶ 47, citing State v. Smith, 2014 UT 33, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 573). Talbert did not show how any justiciability doctrine from Natalie R. v. State, 2025 UT 5, 567 P.3d 550, applied (¶¶ 48–49).

Issue 4: Notice and procedural due process (none stated, ¶ 25): not reached

These claims were waived because Talbert never sought a continuance. The court treated State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), as controlling (¶ 56) and distinguished State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988), which did not address continuances and relied on since-amended constitutional language, as noted in State v. Williamson, 2024 UT App 141, ¶¶ 46–48, 558 P.3d 143 (¶¶ 54–55). The court had asked the supreme court to recall the case to harmonize Fulton and Ortega; it declined (n.5). Failure to seek a continuance does not waive a sufficiency challenge (¶¶ 56, 58).

Issue 5: Count 2 sufficiency/variance (mixed, ¶ 25): affirmed (no error)

The unpreserved variance-based sufficiency claim fails under both plain error and ineffective assistance. Threshold: the court first rejected the State’s argument that the information was “effectively amended” by the instruction change; amendment requires the court’s leave under rule 4(d), and no one sought it (¶¶ 37–42). Preservation: the one-sentence directed verdict motion did not raise the variance theory (¶¶ 61–65, citing State v. Skinner, 2020 UT App 3, ¶ 23, 457 P.3d 421). Plain error: any error was not obvious given the stipulated instruction (¶¶ 67–69). Ineffective assistance: counsel could reasonably foresee that the State would shift its election to other over-the-clothing genital touching (¶¶ 73–77) or move to amend under Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d), which could reasonably be expected to be granted under State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), since Talbert’s fabrication defense applied either way (¶¶ 78–80). A futile motion is not deficient performance (¶ 81).

Issue 6: Count 6 directed verdict (correctness, ¶ 26): affirmed (no error)

The evidence supported a finding that Talbert used his penis: no fingernail felt, Taylor saw him putting his pants back on, and Taylor told the nurse it could have been his penis (¶¶ 84–85, applying State v. Pierce, 2022 UT 22, ¶ 32, 511 P.3d 1164). Talbert was in any event convicted only of the lesser offense of forcible sexual abuse (¶¶ 86–87).

Not reached

Issue 1: a bolstering-based ineffective assistance claim Talbert withdrew in his reply brief (¶ 24 n.4).

Takeaways

  • Altering an instruction that recites the charges does not “effectively amend” the information without the court’s leave (¶¶ 39–41).
  • Not seeking a continuance waives variance-based notice and procedural due process claims, but not sufficiency challenges (¶ 56).
  • A generic directed verdict motion does not preserve a variance theory (¶ 65).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
State v. Talbert
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 97
Case no.
20240192-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
June 25, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Heard
Argued
Who appealed
Talbert
Disposition
Affirmed
At stake
Six jury convictions for sexual crimes against the defendant's minor stepchild

The panel

Ryan M. HarrisAuthor
Michele M. Christiansen ForsterConcurred
Amy J. OliverConcurred
Trial court
Fourth District Court, Provo Department · Judge Kraig J. Powell

Parties & counsel

Talbert — AppellantIndividual(s)Dallas B. Young
State — AppelleeState of UtahDerek E. BrownWilliam M. Hains

Practice Tip

When the trial evidence departs from the act alleged in the information, ask for a continuance to protect notice and due process claims, and make a directed verdict motion that names the variance; a bare motion did not preserve the point here (¶¶ 56, 65).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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