Can the Utah Labor Commission dismiss a workers' compensation claim for obstruction of an independent medical exam? Hooker v. Labor Commission Explained

Background and facts

Laura Hooker filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Utah Labor Commission after suffering injuries at her Kroger job in 2015, leading to a diagnosis of complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS). During the proceedings, Kroger exercised its statutory right under Utah Code section 34A-2-602(1) to require Hooker to attend an independent medical examination (IME). Three separate IMEs failed — involving disputes over paperwork, recording attempts, and air-conditioning complaints — prompting the Labor Commission Appeals Board to conclude that Hooker had engaged in a pattern of obstructive and antagonistic behavior. After initially limiting the sanction to suspension, the Board reversed course and dismissed Hooker’s claim with prejudice under rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hooker sought judicial review, and the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court.

Key legal issues

The central question was whether the Board could impose dismissal as a sanction for obstructing an IME, or whether Utah Code section 34A-2-602(2) — which mandates suspension as the remedy — exclusively governs. The Board had relied on Barker v. Labor Commission, 2023 UT App 31, to reason that because medical examinations constitute part of the discovery process, the full panoply of rule 37(b) sanctions was available. The Court also addressed whether Hooker had standing to challenge the monetary sanctions imposed on her attorneys.

Court’s analysis and holding

The Court reviewed the Board’s statutory construction for correctness and held that dismissal is not an available sanction. Beginning with the plain language of section 34A-2-602(2), the Court observed that the statute’s use of “shall be suspended” is mandatory, leaving no discretion to impose a different sanction. Applying the expressio unius canon, the Court reasoned that the Legislature’s choice of one specific sanction signals the exclusion of others. The Court further applied the specific-general canon: where a specific statutory provision conflicts with a general agency rule — here, the Labor Commission’s incorporation of rule 37(b) — the statute prevails because an agency rule cannot trump a statutory provision. The Court rejected the Board’s reading of Barker, clarifying that while civil procedure rules fill gaps in the discovery framework, they cannot override an express statutory remedy. On the monetary sanctions issue, the Court held that Hooker lacked standing because any relief would benefit only her attorneys, not Hooker herself.

Practice implications

This decision has significant consequences for workers’ compensation practitioners on both sides. Employers should understand that no matter how persistent or egregious an employee’s obstruction of an IME, the available sanction is suspension — not dismissal. Employees should recognize that suspension remains a meaningful consequence, freezing benefits and claim progress during the period of obstruction. Practitioners challenging agency sanctions should lead with the expressio unius and specific-general canons whenever a statute prescribes a particular remedy. Finally, when monetary sanctions are imposed on counsel rather than a party, ensure the challenge is brought by the attorney directly rather than the client, or standing will be lacking.