Utah Court of Appeals · Published Opinion

Does an 1886 town plat give a city a street my family used? Johnson v. Moab City

2026 UT App 100No. 20240925-CADecided Jul 2, 2026Real Property & Land UseReversed

Holding

Applying the rebuttable presumption that public officials properly performed their duties, the court held that title to a street on the 1886 Moab Townsite Plat vested through the probate judge’s townsite entry before the 1890 Luster Patent and passed to Moab, so Moab was entitled to summary judgment quieting title.

Key takeaways

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Moab City and told the district court to give the city title to the entire disputed parcel.

  • Moab owns the whole disputed parcel because title through the 1886 town plat vested before the 1890 federal patent to Luster.
  • Courts presume that public officials did their duties properly, and the person saying otherwise has to prove it.
  • Johnson had no evidence that anyone occupied the land before 1886, so a case about earlier settlers did not help him.

What happened?

On November 16, 1886, Probate Judge Jasper Robertson approved the Moab Townsite Plat, a map that laid out Moab’s blocks and streets. The disputed parcel sits entirely inside a street shown on that map. In July 1890 the federal government issued a land patent (a document granting public land to a private person) that gave James Luster 120 acres, including the parcel. The plat was recorded in 1891.

Johnson’s family owned the land next door and, Johnson said, used most of the parcel as part of their yard. Starting in the 1960s, Moab put water, sewer and stormwater lines on the parcel, and in the 1970s it added curb, gutter and pavement.

In 2008 Moab planned to extend a street through the parcel. In 2019 Johnson filed a quiet title action, a lawsuit asking a court to declare who owns land. Moab filed its own claim to the parcel.

What did each side argue?

Johnson argued the 1890 patent made Luster the owner and that his family had then gained the land by adverse possession, meaning by openly using it for a long time. Moab argued the plat gave it title in 1886, before the patent.

The district court ruled for Johnson on summary judgment (a ruling without a trial). It held the patent controlled, then split the parcel: seven-eighths to Johnson and one-eighth to Moab, based on each side’s use.

What did the Court of Appeals decide?

It reversed. Under the Federal Townsite Act, a public official claimed townsite land by filing at the land office, and no recorded map was needed for that step to count. No records show exactly when Judge Robertson did this, or whether he gave the required newspaper notice and waited six months. But Utah courts presume public officials did their duties properly, and the person challenging that must prove otherwise.

Johnson pointed to no such evidence. The court also noted that a February 1890 deed from Luster to Johnson’s great-grandfather described its boundaries by referring to the plat, which showed the public knew about it. So title vested in Judge Robertson by 1886 and later passed to Moab, ahead of the 1890 patent.

The court rejected Johnson’s other arguments. One older case says a city needs a deed to own land outright, but at most that would mean Moab holds the land in trust for residents, not that Luster owns it. Another case helped settlers who were on the land before the townsite was claimed, but Johnson’s evidence of use started in 1890, four years too late. His argument that the street was never “necessary” was not developed below or in his brief.

What happens now?

The district court must grant Moab’s motion for summary judgment and quiet title to the whole parcel in Moab. Because Luster never held valid title, the court did not need to decide whether anyone gained the land from Luster’s heirs by adverse possession. Johnson did not argue on appeal that he gained it from Moab that way.

What should people take from this?

Very old town maps can still decide who owns land today. A person who says a long-ago official skipped required steps has to bring evidence of that, not just point to missing records.

Bottom line

Reversed and remanded with instructions (Tenney, J., joined by Mortensen and Luthy, JJ.). Title to the Disputed Parcel vested in Probate Judge Robertson through his townsite entry before the Plat’s November 1886 approval, later passed to Moab, and beats the July 1890 Luster Patent. The district court must grant Moab’s motion and quiet title to the whole parcel in Moab (¶¶ 48–49).

Issue 1: Plat versus Luster Patent and adverse possession (correctness, ¶ 22): reversed

Moab’s title through the 1886 townsite entry and Plat is superior to the Luster Patent, so the district court should have granted Moab’s motion and denied Johnson’s in full, and the adverse possession ruling built on the contrary premise fell with it (¶¶ 24, 48, 48 n.11).

Part 1: Plat versus Luster Patent (¶¶ 23–48). A patent is void if issued for land already granted, per Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. 284, 318 (1844) (¶ 24). Under the Federal Townsite Act, “enter” meant filing a claim at the land office, as in Chotard v. Pope, 25 U.S. 586, 588 (1827) and Lockwitz v. Larson, 52 P. 279, 280 (Utah 1898), and no recorded plat was required for the entry to take effect (¶¶ 26–28). The record lacks the entry date and proof of newspaper notice or the six-month wait, but the court applied a rebuttable presumption that officials performed their duties properly, from Tooele Bldg. Ass’n v. Tooele High School Dist. No. 1, 134 P. 894, 897 (Utah 1913), and put the burden of rebutting it on Johnson (¶¶ 30–34). Johnson offered no rebuttal evidence, and the February 1890 Luster-Wilcox Deed’s reference to the Plat supports public notice (¶ 34).

Johnson’s counterarguments failed:

  • Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), at most means a city without a deed holds land in trust, not that the patent controls; Johnson alleged no breach of fiduciary duty (¶¶ 37–40).
  • Hall v. North Ogden City, 175 P.2d 703 (Utah 1946), turns on occupancy before the townsite entry (¶¶ 42–44, following Cox v. Carlisle, 359 P.2d 1049, 1049–50 (Utah 1961) and Judd v. Kanab City, 672 P.2d 87, 88 (Utah 1983) (per curiam)). Johnson’s evidence of occupancy began in 1890 (¶ 45).
  • The “necessary for streets” argument under Utah Code § 57-7-17 was not developed below, had no evidence behind it, and was inadequately briefed, so the court declined to affirm on that alternative ground (¶¶ 46–47, see Pentalon Constr., Inc. v. Rymark Props., LLC, 2015 UT App 29, ¶ 25, 344 P.3d 180).

Preservation: Moab preserved its argument through its summary judgment motion and oral argument (¶ 24 n.8, citing State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443). Incorporation after the Plat was no impediment; title passed to Moab either by recording or through the 1999 repeal’s transition clause (¶ 35 n.9).

Part 2: Adverse possession against Luster’s heirs (not reached, ¶ 48 n.11). Because title never vested in Luster, the court did not need to address adverse possession as against Luster (¶ 48 n.11). Johnson did not separately argue adverse possession against Moab on appeal, and the court quoted Utah Code section 78B-2-216(2) (¶ 48 n.11).

Takeaways

  • Utah recognizes a rebuttable presumption that public officials performed their duties properly; the challenger bears the burden of rebutting it (¶ 33).
  • A Federal Townsite Act entry took effect without a recorded plat, and title can predate recording (¶¶ 28, 35).
  • Hall protects only occupancy that predates the townsite entry (¶¶ 44–45).
  • An alternative ground for affirmance must be apparent on the record and adequately briefed (¶ 47).

Utah cases relied on

Read the full opinion (PDF)

Case details

Case name
Johnson v. Moab City
Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Citation
2026 UT App 100
Case no.
20240925-CA
Filed
2024
Decided
July 2, 2026
Opinion type
Authored
Who appealed
Moab City
Disposition
Reversed
At stake
Title to a Moab parcel shown as a public street on the 1886 Moab Townsite Plat, which the district court quieted seven-eighths in Johnson and one-eighth in Moab

The panel

Ryan D. TenneyAuthor
John D. LuthyConcurred
David N. MortensenConcurred
Trial court
Seventh District Court, Moab Department · Judge Don M. Torgerson

Parties & counsel

Moab City — AppellantGovernment agencyChristopher G. McAnany
Johnson — AppelleeIndividual(s)Justin L. JamesDillon Olson

Practice Tip

A party attacking an old townsite plat or other official act must bring evidence that the official failed to follow required procedures, because gaps in the historical record are filled by a presumption of regularity (¶¶ 33–34).

Need appellate counsel?

Lotus Appellate Law handles appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah Supreme Court, California Court of Appeal, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

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